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Lent and Limits
It is not the end
Of the world, only t he end
Of the world without end.
The Lenten stretch of the Christian story reminds Christians that men are responsible for
their deeds, else they would not need so great a
salvation as the cross. And Lent further reminds
Christians that the powers of this world for good
or for evil are limited, else the powers fqr evil
would have overcome the cross, or the powers for
good would have been sufficient to save mankind
without it.
A Lenten contemplation of the cross therefore
offers Christian comfort against the modern indignity of being held irresponsible for one's deeds
and Christian courage not to think that all is possi}Jle in a limitless world. Those who have been
bought with a price live in the real world counting
costs.
Accordingly, Christians are not surprised that a
price must be paid when finite resources have been
used up as if there were no tomorrow. Such, for
example, is the world's situation regarding oil,
and the day has come when large parts of the
world's economy must be reconstitutued on the
basis of very costly oil and probably no less costly
alternative sources of energy. Christians will be
engaged in the problems aroused by reaching
these limits 1/ for no other reasons than these limits, like the cross, te.ach the wholesome finitude of
this world and the dignity of human responsibility.
Leading us into ·an investigation of the limits of
cheap oil is our February alumni columnist, Richard Nehring, who was graduated from the University in 1965 with a major in history. He then
studied philosophy and economics at Oxford University on a Rhodes Scholarship from 1965 to 1967,
and took his graduate studies in political science at
Stanford University on a Danforth Fellowship
from 1967 to 1971.
Presently Mr. Nehring is a social scientist in
the energy program at the Rand Corporation
where he specializes in fossil fuel supplies studies.
He is the author of Giant Oil Fields and World
Oil Resources (1978) and The Cost of Oil (1980)
He and his wife, Brooke, are members of the University Lutheran Church at UCLA, and they tend
a small orchard and large organic garden around
their home in Pacific Palisades, California.
The Cresset welcomes alumnus Nehring to
In Luce Tua.
The Editor

February, 1980

Nature's Brakes
On Gas and Oil:
Taking Depletion Seriously
Richard Nehring
The late historian David Potter characterized Americans as a people of plenty. He argued that the experience of a large country, blessed with rich soil resources
and a favorable climate, ·seemingly endless forests,
bountiful minerals, and generous supplies of energy,
was the decisive element in shaping the American national character. Given this history, it is not surprising
that most Americans, including most of our business
and political leaders, have seemed incapable of understanding the fundamental reason for the present energy
situation, namely, most of the energy problems that we
face are the initial signs of the pending depletion of the
world's conventional oil and gas resources.
Most energy policy proposals made during the past
six years have ignored this basic fact. The idea that
energy resources are finite has been regarded as unpatriotic, heretical, and defeatist. The common assumption has been that our energy problems are the fault of
bad institutions. The task of policy is to change those
institutions, returning us to the untroubled Eden that
existed before we ever heard of oil embargoes, gasoline
shortages, and outrageous energy bills. For conservatives, this has meant eliminating restrictive government
policies that have shackled the productive efforts of
American industry. For liberals, this has meant eliminating the monopoly powers of the energy industries.
For conservatives and liberals alike, this has meant
countering OPEC power.
Institutional reform, particularly with respect to the
many counter-productive aspects of past government
policy, is clearly part of the agenda of energy policy.
But appropriate institutional reform depends on an
accurate diagnosis of the energy situation. No diagnosis
can be correct that does not take seriously the depletion
of conventional oil and gas resources.
By the end of 1978, approximately 1.1 trillion barrels
of petroleum liquids and 3700 trillion cubic feet of natural gas had been discovered and made recoverable
worldwide. Approximately 424 billion barrels and 1030
trillion cubic feet of these amounts have been produced,
leaving proved and probable reserves of 676 billion
barrels and 2670 trillion cubic feet. Superficially, these
3

The idea that energy resources are finite has been regarded as unpatriotic, heretical and defeatist.
But we will not see petroleum discoveries in the 1980s and 1990s like those of the 1950s and 1960s.
numbers would suggest that depletion is not a serious
immediate problem. After more than a century of petroleum consumption, nearly two-thirds of the conventional
petroleum resources of the world still remain to be
produced. There is still more to be discovered. We can
increase the recovery of oil from fields that have already been discovered. We can also produce oil and
gas from the vast deposits of nonconventional sources
of petroleum, such as the oil sands of Alberta and Venezuela, the oil shales of Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming,
and the Devonian shales of the Appalachian region of
the United States.
This seeming abundance does not however justify
taking the problems of depletion lightly. Because of
(1) what we now know about the extent and distribution
of world petroleum resources, (2) current rates of world
petroleum consumption, (3) the decades that will be
required to adjust to depletion, and (4) the cost of substitutes for conventional petroleum supplies, depletion
deserves to he the starting point of all appropriate personal, corporate, and governmental action on energy.
The reasons for taking depletion seriously begin with
what we know about the extent and distribution of world
petroleum resources. The key facts can be summarized
in just three points. The first and most important of
these is that petroleum resources are highly concentrated in a small number of sedimentary provinces.
The presence of hydrocarbons in sedimentary areas
is a common phenomenon. There are approximately
600 sedimentary provinces in the world. Exploratory
drilling has occurred in more than 400, resulting in discoveries in nearly 240. Indications of hydrocarbons have
been encountered in most of the rest. The near ubiquity
of hydrocarbons in sedimentary areas should not blind
us to the mu ch more important fact that significant
accumulations of petroleum are statistically rare.
A meaningful measure of significance is current world
consumption of petroleum. In 1978, total world consumption of petroleum was approximately 32 billion
barrels of liquid and liquid-equivalent petroleum resources (roughly 23 billion barrels of petroleum liquids
and 54 trillion cubic feet of natural gas converted to
liquid equivalents at the standard thermal conversion
rate of 6000 cubic feet to the barrel). A.fter more than a
century of petroleum exploration covering nearly all of
the prospective areas of the world, we have discovered
only ten provinces containing more oil and gas than we
currently consume in one year. Those ten provinces
contain 72 percent of all the petroleum liquids and 61
percent of all the natural gas discovered to date. Only
two of them contain more oil and gas than we currently
consume in two years-the Arabian-Iranian (Middle
East) province with oil and gas resources equivalent to
twenty years of current world consumption and the West
Siberian province with oil and gas resources equivalent
4

to five years of current world consumption.
Besides these ten super-provinces, there are only
twenty more major provinces with petroleum resources
equivalent to three to twelve months of current world
petroleum consumption (8 to 32 billion barrels). Together the thirty largest provinces contain 89 percent of
the known recoverable petroleum liquids and 83 percent
of the known recoverable natural gas resources of the
world. The other 210 provinces with producible fields
thus contain only 11 percent of the petroleum liquids
and 17 percent of the natural gas, over half of which are
in around 35 provinces with 2 to 8 billion barrels each.
Thus nearly all of the world's conventional petroleum
resources are concentrated in only 15 percent of the explored sedimentary provinces.

More Than Belt-Tightening is Needed
United States production is also concentrated in a few
major provinces. In only nine of the nearly sixty productive sedimentary provinces in the United States have
we found more oil and gas than we currently consume in
just one year-an estimated 6.7 billion barrels and 19.5
trillion cubic feet in 1979. These nine provinces contain
129 of the 174 billion barrels of petroleum liquids (74%)
and 624 of the 754 trillion cubic feet (83%) discovered in
the United States to date. In over seventy-five years of
exploration in the most significant of these- the Mississippi Delta (south Louisiana), we have found only five
years worth of current U.S. consumption. Whether in
the U .S. or worldwide, this concentration in a few highly
productive areas is overwhelmingly a consequence of
basic geologic differences, not of differences in exploration effort.
The second key point about conventional world petroleum resources is that they are highly concentrated in
a small number of large fields. Since petroleum exploration began, approximately 30,000 fields have been discovered. But more than 90 percent of these fields are
insignificant as far as world petroleum resources are
concerned. The 52 super-giant fields discovered to
date-those with 5 billion barrels or 30 trillion cubic
feet or more-contain 52 percent and 41 percent, respectively, of the world's known recoverable conventional oil and gas resources. The approximately 400
known giant fields (including the super-giants)- those
with 500 million barrels or 3 trillion cubic feet or morecontain approximately 850 billion barrels of petroleum
liquids and 2600 trillion cubic feet of naLural gas, 77 percent and 70 percent, respectively, of the world's conventional oil and gas resources. The approximately 1400
known large fields-those with 50 to 500 million barrels
or the equivalent in gas-contain at least another 175
billion barrels of oil and 750 trillion cubic feet of natural
gas. Thus, only 6 percent of the known fields contain
The Cresset

At current rates of consumption, the world has 50 t o 7 0 remaining years of conventional oil supplies.
By the 1990s we must ha ve considerably reduced oil c onsumption to avoid major economic dislocations .
over 93 percent of the world's known conventional oil
resources and over 90 percent of the known conventional
natural gas resources.
Significant petroleum fields and significant petroleum
provinces are closely associated. The ten super-provinces
contain 44 of the 52 super-giant fields. In almost all of
the thirty major provinces, the oil and gas res011rces are
concentrated in a small number of giant and st..per-giar.t
fields. The concentration in a few major fields is particularly marked in the major oil-exporting countries.
More than 90 percent of the oil resources of Saudi Arabia
are found in just eleven fields. This level is reached with
just five fields in Abu Dhabi, seventeen in Iran, six in
Iraq, two in Kuwait, fourteen in Libya, and twenty-two
in Venezuela.

A Unique Episode in Hist ory is O ver
The third key point is that modern petroleum exploration is an efficient process. If major fields do exist in a
province, most are likely to be discovered by the time
25 to 200 exploratory wells have been drilled in the
province. The high efficiency of modern exploration is
the result of advances in geologic knowledge and exploratory technology over the past fifty years that now
enable the petroleum industry to locate most potential
major petroleum traps with relative ease.
These three points considered together provide a
powerful means for predicting the ultimate conventional
petroleum resources of the world. Because only major
and super-provinces make any appreciable difference to
the total, the few-probably no more than a dozenprovinces that are unexplored or only lightly explored
that have the potential to become major provinces mean
that we will not see additions to the world's petroleum
supply from new discoveries in the 1980s and the 1990s
like those of the 1950s and 1960s. Because modern petroleum exploration is efficient, the probability of
future giant field discoveries in most of the known
major provinces is slim.
Considering the prospects for future discoveries and
additional recovery in the known producing provinces
and the prospects of unexplored or lightly explored
provinces, I estimate that ultimate conventional production of world petroleum liquids will be between 1.6
and 2.0 trillion barrels. Ultimate conventional production of natural gas will be between 5000 and 6500 trillion
cubic feet. At current rates of consumption, this means
50 to 70 years of conventional oil supplies and 65 to 90
years of conventional natural gas supplies.
Given this potential, depletion obviously does not
mean that we will have run out of oil or natural gas by
next year or even in this century. What it does mean is
that we can have at best only modest growth in world
oil and gas consumption during the 1980s, and that by
February, 1980

the 1990s we have to be making major efforts to reduce
consumption of world oil and gas if we are to avoid
major economic dislocations.
From this vantage point, the third quarter of the twentieth century appears to be a unique episode in world
history. It was both the peak period of petroleum discoveries and the culmination of more than a century of
rapid growth in world oil consumption. From the early
1860s to the 1970s, world oil consumption grew at an
average rate of more than 7 percent per year. This exponential growth rate has several unusual properties.
At this rate of growth, consumption doubles every decade, consumption during the most recent decade equalling all previous consumption.
When consumption of a finite resource begins at very
low levels and increases at this rate, it can continue
smoothly through several doubling periods. The economic expansion, based on the rapid growth in consumption of inexpensive oil and natural gas that occurred
in both the United States and worldwide during the
1950s and 1960s, was such an episode. However, once
consumption reaches large absolute levels, nature's
brakes begin to be applied. By 1975, world oil consumption would have reached such a point. The Arab-Israeli
war 1973 and the accompanying embargo and major
price increases advanced the necessary shocks that the

THE CRESSEY
The Question
Of the Ordination
Of Women
The Cresset was pleased to publish the position
papers of Theodore Jungkuntz and Walter E. Keller
on "The Question of the Ordination of Women" in
its December, 1978, and January, 1979, issues.
In response to reader interest, the Cresset is further
pleased to announce that reprints of both position
papers in one eight-page folio are now available for
congregational and pastoral conference study.
Please accompany reprint orders with a check
payable to the Cresset and mai l to:
The Cresset

Valparaiso University
Valparaiso, Indians 46383
Single Copy, 25C
10 Copies for 20C E~~eh
100 Copie• for 15C E•ch
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system had to undergo by several months. If the growth
in world oil consumption continued at historic rates
for just another decade from the early 1970s to the early
1980s, the remaining recoverable conventional oil resources would be good for 25 to 35 more years of consumption at the rate attained by 1983.
As events turned out, consumption may have been
restrained early enough for the transition to occur from
conventional supplies of oil and gas to other sources of
energy without the world undergoing an economic and
political disaster. Time is of crucial importance for such
a transition. Developing new sources of energy supply
to significant levels of production will take several decades. Currently most major new energy projects-nuclear power plants, coal gasification facilities, production from oil sands-individually take a decade from
initiation to completion. Training the necessary manpower, producing the capital goods, and refining the
technologies used for many plants will take even longer.
Altering the way we use energy will also take decades.
Existing factories, houses, and automobiles will be replaced only gradually. In many cases, improvements in
the efficiency of energy-using goods will occur slowly
as well.

Conservation Costs Less than Catastrophe
The depletion of conventional supplies of oil and gas
resources confronts the world with a major challenge.
Past consumption increased as rapidly as it did because
most conventional deposits of oil and gas were inexpensive to find and produce. The most important fact about
future energy supplies is that they are expensive, even
in those cases where they are relatively plentiful. Most
of the world's conventional oil was found and produced
at a cost of $0.50 to $1.00 per barrel. Most of the world's
nonconventional sources of oil are producible at a cost
of $10 to $50 per barrel. If we attempt to rontinue present
habits of energy use, replacing inexpensive oil and gas
completely with expensive oil and gas-or expensive
nuclear or expensive solar power, the economy will not
be able to provide the required investment.
The challenge of depletion can be met only if the first
priority of personal, corporate, and governmental efforts is a massive transformation of the many ways in
which we use energy. This strategy, commonly known
as "conservation," does not primarily mean belt-tightening during temporary shortages. It means an entire
rethinking and revolutionizing of both our energyusing equipment and our habits of energy use. No other
approach costs as little. No other approach avoids the
immense and seemingly intractable environmental
dilemmas associated with most new energy sources.
Depletion does not automatically mean disaster. But it
does mean change. The challenge for all of us is to make
those changes intelligently, creatively, and justly.

a
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Thomas Coates
October 1, 1910-January3, 1980
Good Show, Tommy!
From March, 1941, to January, 1947, Thomas
Coates was in fact, though never in title, managing
editor of the Cresset. Coming onto the scene only
four years after the founding of the magazine, he
played a decisive role in defining its purpose, giving it a tone at once confessional and ecumenical,
and assembling a stable of writers. For all that he
gave to our magazine, we who later inherited it
have reason to be grateful.
But the news of Tommy's death in Hong Kong
on January 3 sets his life and ministry in a larger
perspective. It was appropriate that he ended his
days where he had spent his whole life, on one of
the Church's frontiers. Asia is a geographical
frontier, still resistant to Christian entry. But so
is the world of literature, the arts, and public
affairs a frontier for the Church. And so, for that
matter, were little, struggling Concordia College
in Portland, where he served for a time as
president, and the new, experimental, and
therefore threatening Concordia Senior College
where he headed the Department of Theology.
Tommy was well equipped for a frontier ministry. He enjoyed, but in any ultimate sense did
not need, the company and approval of men. He
moved from place to place, not in furtherance
of any career plans but "On His Majesty's Service."
The words that come to my mind as I recall our
years of working together are integrity and discipline and, most of all, faith. It was, finally, only
his faith that enabled him to remain true to his
calling and to his Lord in the last, sad years when
only Grace Church in River Forest, Illinois, was
willing to support him in his ministry.
Good show, Tommy. Give our regards to O.P.
and Geisey and Graeby and the rest of the old
Cresset crowd.

John Strietelmeier
for the Cresset Editors
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Artisans and Partisans
The Politics of Craftsmanship
Jay C. Rochelle

In Small Economic Systems, Politics is the Inside of Labor
Seven houses west of Fifth Avenue on Fifteenth Street in downtown Manhattan, in a basement store that seems to go
on forever, two wizened shopkeepers ply their wares. They are Mr. and Mrs. Joseph Torch, and they own an art supply
store noted for its selection of handmade papers which are lovingly and expertly handled ~y Mrs. Torch, a diminutive
woman plain in dress but mighty in knowledge. For the Torches are not just store owners but shopkeepers of the old
school, who know everything there is to know about the products they handle: who made them, how they are made, what
their contents are-the whole process.
Mrs. Torch will spend literally hours with customers who come in the first time, and, if you mention you are a
calligrapher (usually you won't have to; she will ask for the specific uses to which you will put the paper), she will
guide you through their selections. She will show you papers from Italy, France, England, Africa, and the United States,
ranging in quality from 100 per cent linen down to ten per cent rag. She will carefully explain the difference between
a wove and laid paper, if you don't know, and will also tell how the quality varies from handmade to moldmade to mill made
paper. She will also tell what sorts of sizing were used, if any, and in what papers. The place is a calligrapher's
dream come true; everyone who does calligraphy in the northeast corner of the United States eventually must go to Mrs.
Torch simply for the education, even if you leave with only ten sheets of Michaelangelo at $1.20 per sheet.
As you wander through this store with its faint musty smell and see the tens of thousands of sheets of paper laid
on simple wooden shelves built from floor to ceiling, you begin to sense a different period in craftsmanship on display;
It is not the period of the arts and crafts revival under Morris but the result of that movement when there was
a growth of small companies committed to excellence.
The apex of the Torch collection of papers is Whatman paper from England, a 100 per cent linen hand and moldmade
paper of various types. Y0u feel this stock and you realize that, under normal conditions, it will suffer no discoloration
as it "~.ges. It is the closest thing to a perfect paper you can buy, and when you feel it and smell it and hold it up to
the light you can see why: it is even in texture with no thick or thin areas; the pulp is laid in a specific and very
regular pattern, and it has an absolutely consistent tooth on the writing side. It is the result of the highest
craftsmanship in papermaking in England. Whatman, however, went out of business during the great depression;
Torch has the remaining supply of Whatman paper in the world.
Whatman paper suffered that defeat which has befallen so many small businesses. The Fabriano mills of Italy were
the oldest in the Western hemisphere; many thought they would last forever . The Fabriano mills folded in 1978; the
greatest of the Italian papermaking companies is no more. The combination of three forces-cost, rate of production,
and competition from lower-priced inferior imitations-puts many companies out of business whose only crime is that they
are not geared for mass production but strive for quality.
The world of excellent craftsmanship is based on small economic systems. In the future, operations like Whatman
and Fabriano will rise again in new forms as cottage industries run as elaborate hobbies by those who make enough money
from regular investments in mass markets. Only they will be able to withstand the economic uncertainty attendant upon small
businesses studying for excellence in small quantities .
Craftsmen trust trained hands above slick minds; slow and meticulous and loving work is prized above mass or instant
production. This gives birth to a political mentality which intuitively refuses partial answers to social problems
because of its focus on the interrelatedness of individual small parts. Craftsmen as a group tend to be critical of and
wary about political solutions to social problems; they are more likely to be involved in a small-scale politics,
building the systems of relationships which help them survive in the marketplace and at home.

The campus pastor for the University Lutheran Ministry in New Haven, Connecticut, and chairperson for the Yale
Religious Ministries, Jay C. Rochelle holds his M.Div. from Concordia Seminary, St . Louis, and his Th.M. in biblical literature from Pittsburgh Theological Seminary. In addition to his special interest in the art and politics of calligraphy and other crafts, Pastor Rochelle cuts and prints linoleum and wood blocks, and bakes and bikes.
February, 1980
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In the Materiallnscape
Is the Interior Meaning of Crafting

It takes a while to grind the ink.
You have to make decisions about which stone
to use for the grinding; if it is to be graded
ink, it must be a Japanese stone. If you are
aiming for one consistency, you use the Chinese stone.
Then decisions must be made about the gloss of the ink. If you want a high gloss, you use the Sumi ink. If you want a
dull finish, you use a Chinese inkstick which contains no lacquer. The final decision is how much ink to prepare because
if you underestimate the amount needed , it is very difficult to make exactly the same consistency a second time.
Now you are ready to grind the ink.
Drop by drop the water is poured out until you have enough for your purposes; then the ink is slowly ground with
a circular motion which moves now clockwise, now counterclockwise. This stops sharp edges from developing on the
inkstick, edges which could chip off and ruin the consistency of the ink. The pattern is rhythmic and needs a certain
emptiness for its completion; a muddled mind will produce muddy ink. As the ink is slowly created under your fingertips
and becomes a reflection pool in which your face is mirrored , the smell of the pine forest whence it originally came
sweeps over you to create a deep sense of calm and serenity.
Next, a pen is necessary, and a reed is selected whose barrel is the right size for the work at hand . The knife
is checked for sharpness. The first cut is made to clean and angle the end of the reed ; then a hairline split is run up
about half an inch from the end just angled. The reed is turned upside down to face the penmaker who then draws the
knife in a slighfly circular motion toward himself to create a gentle curve about an inch long to the tip of the shaft.
The sides of the curve are then tapered, a bevel is cut on what is now the top of the emergent p en , and lastly a straight
cut across the end makes the nib of the pen.
The tool is soaked in water a few minutes to fill the fibers so they will not suck the ink but allow it to flow
onto the paper. The tool is simultaneously sensual and natural. Its sensuality is a necessary part of its naturalness.
Natural tools simply have more feeling than do machine-made tools. A steel pen does not have the touch of a reed;
a plain wood pencil has more tactile sensitivity than does a ball-point pen. And in this case, a natural item is used
on a natural item which is its cousin.
As I lean rather close to the paper, since I am about to write small, I focus on the whiteness of the page.
It is empty space about to be pierced by a mark which will change forever its character. As I begin to write,
I focus on the minim-the smallest part of the individual letter-and I see it. I see it!
Perhaps the miracle of craftsmanship is precisely in this seeing, this beholding, this wonderment; in the making
of one letter the whole of the craft is summed up. The history and the technique is in my hand, in my mind , the skill
is in the discipline I've undergone, and the tools are simple extensions of myself which I know intimately because I
have made them. All of this energy is poured out the end of the pen as the first strokes are made, and I see this:
I see the history, the discipline, the tools, and what emerges from them with me as the vehicle is a free and personal
and real letter which is not an abstraction or an idea in the mind. The potential has become the actual, and I see it!
Furthermore, I see into my own personality at the same time; I have captured eternity in a moment and seen it, not
in Blake's grain of sand, but in Rochelle's capital A-which means I may also see it in the grain of sand. In the moment
of eternity was the state of my soul made visible, sometimes for better and sometimes for worse . But that it was
revealed at all! This is the interior meaning of crafting, of all crafting, be it weaving or pottery, or calligraphy.
The medium doesn't matter in the long run except as personal choice and economic possibility. But the interiority of
the crafting matters and, with time, it is revealed to you. The reward of discipline is freedom ; the reward of looking
into the craft and learning it is seeing into the craft and learning about yourself.
If contemporary work-forms rob and cl.rain p~ople of their souls, then they have.become the demonic counterpoint to
the fulfillment found in crafting. To see what Gerard Manley Hopkins called the "inscape of things" is to enter an arena
where work and leisure dualisms are overcome and where thought of profit is the outcome of, not the impulse to, labor.
Craftsmen may not say much about this mysterious inside of their labors, but they know it and they know that it is
profoundly political-even if we have troubles translating it into a political "program."
8

Th e Cresset

In the Emergent Community, The Future Belongs to Soft Technology
In G. K. Chesterton's novel The Napoleon of Notting Hill, a time is foreseen when the government of England will
be so routine and vapid that no one will want to be engaged in it. Such government will be made up of long lines of
ascetic-looking men all dressed in drab and uninteresting clothing matching their drab and uninteresting work.
The hero, whom we first see as a young boy adulating the uniform of the deposed King of Nicaragua, grows up to
become a friend of the Prime Minister-a man whose craziness is of such a kind that he makes ludicrous decisions
which turn out to be interesting. One such decision is to recreate the neighborhoods of London as fiefdoms:
Hammersmith, Chelsea, Kensington, Notting Hill, and the rest. Each fiefdom reinstitutes its heraldry and pageantry,
and our hero becomes the King of Notting Hill. To everyone's surprise, he takes the job seriously! Chesterton's
point is obvious: communities are made up of small units, each bearing a sense of place and pride and history.
Large-scale government is nothing but management and can never be otherwise.
This small-scale political community has been enacted many times over, I think notably in the arts and crafts
movement and in institutions of higher learning where arts and crafts were taught. Think for a moment of the guilds
organized by William Morris and others in the Victorian arts and crafts revival; think again of the work and writings
of Eric Gill or of the small press movement and the noble experiment of Black Mountain College. Today these small-scale
political communities rise again, like the recurrent phoenixes from the ashes of burnt-out cultures. Many craftsmen
today are convinced the current social structure is destined for oblivion and are already making contacts and networks
which serve a political as well as economic purpose in their lives. Perhaps the next wave of revolution belongs to
the soft technologies and the artisans, and Chesterton's old novel makes immediate sense.
The search of the Eighties will be for communities which enable one to pay the piper for the dying, oil-drained,
monopolist capitalist structure while creating a subculture of meaningful social and interpersonal relationships.
Craftsmen hope to balance the pressures of the first with the relaxed ambience of the second. Because of this search,
William Morris will rise in importance once more. The sharp marketers of Pantheon Press re-issued the 1955 biography
by E. P. Thompson in 1976 in anticipation of this rise in importance. Even Morris's romantic novels will re-appear:
News from Nowhere and The Well at the World's End have both come out in paperback in the last three years .
Morris is important because he experienced in his time what we have experienced in our own; consequently the
movement of Morris's life may provide some clues for the movement of the lives of craftsmen into the last two
decades of this century. Morris moved from naive capitalism to romanticism to medievalism and finally and quite
logically to socialism. His was guild socialism heavily influenced by the thought of Charles Kingsley and F. D. Maurice,
the Christian socialists, and also by Karl Marx.
The crafting life is almost by its nature a socialist life. By this I certainly do not mean the top-heavy,
so-called socialisms of governments like the Soviet Union or Sweden, but a system of relationships characterized by
the direct exchange of finished goods in which mercantile considerations are minimized. Furthermore, it is a system
in which the conditions of production and the act of production are in the same hands. It stems, in this instance,
from a form of labor in which little dishonesty is possible because the craftsman is creatively responsible for the
finished product. Ruskin said that the industrial revolution far from resulting in the division of labor, actually
resulted in a schizophrenic division within people whereby mind and body, intellec and activity, work and leisure
could no longer be united. In a crafting society the dualism is overcome because conception, planning, execution,
and evaluation are all within the work of the craftsman.
My fantasy is that this has all happened before, that in fact the mass industrial civilization rose as high
as it was able through exploiting the greed and avarice within people-and then something happened. People began to
look at one another in a new way and to say, "What is this all for? Life is no fun anymore." So gradually they
dismantled the system until economics and politics really were carried on as if people mattered, to use the late
Fritz Schumacher's phrase. All the alternatives were played with; false choices were gradually weeded out; and
in the end it was seen, as though in a vision, that "the only alternative, if mankind is to survive, is the
non-materialistic counterculture. Some of its characteristics are a loss of ego-centric acquisitiveness, cooperation,
an appropriate use of technology, decentralization in government and production, small local factories using local
materials and full employment, non-violence, compassion, organic gardening, development of the arts and crafts, and
a culture based on the realization of the spiritual nature of the universe."1 • •

••

1

Lloyd Rey nold s. The Decline of Mat en a/ism (Portland, Oregon : The A leu in Press, 1978 ), final paragraph.
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The Nation

The Hidden Costs
Of Nuclear Power
And the Solar
Alternatives
Richard Hansis
Most Americans are now accustomed to moral appeals from their
fellow citizens opposed to nuclear
power plants. Sometimes acts of
civil disobedience try to arouse their
consciences to a moral ·choice against
nuclear power. Most Americans are
equally familiar with the seemingly
pragmatic arguments which would
justify building more nuclear power
plants. Nuclear industry advertising
and lobbying try to make the case
for the plants on economic grounds
and emotional appeals to our hope
for national survival. Since these
two positions often cross each other
at right angles, a possible way out of
the impasse may be to discuss the
nuclear issue in terms amenable to

Richard Hansis is Assistant Professor of Geography at Valparaiso University and holds his Ph.D . from
Pennsylvania State University . His
areas of specialization include economic geography and cultural
geography, and his interest in conservation leads him to his present
participation in the Bailly Alliance,
a group which aims to prevent the
construction of the Bailly I Nuclear
Plant on the shores of Lake Michigan, thirteen miles from the Valparaiso campus.

10

O nce we were told that electricity from nuclear
power plants would be "too cheap to meter."
analysis. Such a discussion does not
exclude moral arguments, since any
analysis of the nuclear issue is a basis
for the evaluations of the dangers involved in producing-or not producing-electrical energy from nuclear reactors.
In the present "energy crisis,"
some voices cry out for American
energy independence and urge
more rapid construction of nuclear
power plants. These same voices
often accuse opponents of nuclear
power of being irrational, emotional, anti-technology, anti-progress, and of advocating a return to
feudalism, if not a return to the
caves. By playing on the legitimate
fears of people who depend on energy for their livelihoods, these
voices speak in tones they ascribe to
their adversaries. What needs to be
done is to avoid the loud accusations of both sides and to take a
longer look at the economic, social,
and environmental impacts implied
by the use of nuclear energy-and
its alternatives.
A few facts concerning nuclear
power plants may be helpful. The
seventy-two commercial plants in
the United States produce 12 per
cent of our electrical energy, and
electrical energy makes up approximately 12 per cent of the energy
Americans now use. Thus, electrical energy generated by nuclear
power is a rather small per cent of
our total energy use. Smallness is
no proof of insignificance, however, One argument of nuclear
power advocates is that nuclear
power saves on imported oil. If oil
were used as a base load fuel-that
is, as the fuel generating electricity
during normal usage-then the argument that nuclear energy saves
on imported oil would be valid. The
argument is weakened, however, by
the fact that oil is rarely used as a
base load fuel, and most oil-fired
generators are only used during
peak demand times.
A second piece of useful knowledge concerns the end use of each

form of energy. We should match
each type of energy to the end· to
which it is put. For example, some
forms of energy work best in a liquid or gaseous form; we propel our
automobiles with gasoline, alcohol,
or methane. Although electricity is
suitable for certain motors and industrial processes, we should think
of electricity as inappropriate for
heating our homes and hot water
tanks. The foolishness of such uses
for electricity appears when we
think of the energy transformations
necessary to heat water by electricity. At the generator, water is
heated to steam at temperatures of
600 to 1000° F, while other water cools
the generator. This transformation
results in much energy loss, and
more energy is also lost in transmission. Seventy per cent of the energy
of coal fuel-and even more of
uranium- is lost before it reaches
the hot water heater where cold
water is electrically heated to 140° F.
There are more appropriate ways to
heat water, including gas and direct
solar heating. Rational use of energy sources would include using
the appropriate energy for each use.

Anti-Nuclear forces are
accused of advocating a
return to feudalism, if
not a return to the caves.
Our energy planning must provide
for safe and renewable energy which
people can afford. While no energy
source is completely environmentally benign, energy planning must
provide for the maximum use of
those energy sources which are most
benign. Finally, energy planning
must consider the socio-economic
(employment patterns, population
movements, etc.) impact of the energy provided. We call energy "renewable" if it comes from an almost
infinitely available source. Nuclear
fission is a nonrenewable source of
energy; the supply of fissionable materials, so far as we now know, is limited. Even the use of the breeder reThe Cresset

The time has come to ask how the cost of nuclear energy compares to the costs of other
forms of energy, and more than dollar quotations are necessary to answer the question.
actor which generates more fuel
than it uses- but is more dangerous - does not provide us with renewable energy, although such reactors could provide energy for
some time into the future. Electricity from breeder reactors, however,
does not meet the safety and affordability criteria set forth above. The
cost of the first large breeder reactor
is estimated at $5000 per installed
kilowatt of capacity.
Fusion power fueled by an isotope of water has been viewed with
much hope . Water is almost limitless, bu t the problem of dispersing
the immense amounts of waste heat
during fusion makes unlimited use
of fusion less than encouraging. Fusion also produces radioactive materials-those materials which contain the fusion reaction-and constitutes an environmental hazard
of considerable risk. Furthermore,
fusion power is still not demonstrated technically, much less economically.
Solar energy in its various forms
-direct solar energy for heating
and cooling, photovoltaic cells for
electricity, wind for electricity, and
alcohol and methane from plants
and animals for heat and electriccity-seems to meet the criteria established above. Economic feasibility in some cases is a real question, but as we shall see, feasibility
is a very real question for nuclear
power too.
The solution to the problems of
nuclear power- building and operating safe reactors , minimizing health
hazards, disposing of radioactive
wastes, and decommissioning plants
after twenty to forty years of operation-is expensive, if possible. Nuclear power is not even a good Faustian bargain. At a time when some
sectors of industry are worrying
about a capital shortage, the financial dem ands upon them for their
energy su pplies are increasing precipitously. Moving capital to meet
energy costs makes it less available
for productive activities, and the
February, 198Q

capital investments needed for nuclear power plants are enormous.
In 1953, Lewis Strauss, Chairman
of the Atomic Energy Commission,
maintained that electricity produced
from nuclear power plants would be
"too ch eap to meter." Today we
chuckle at such naivete, but the optimism which Strauss expressed encouraged the push for nuclear power
in the recent past. The time has
come to ask how the cost of nuclear
power compares to other forms of
energy, and more than dollar and
cents quotations are necessary to
answer the question .

Our children will have to
pay for decommissioning
the nuclear reactors we
build in this generation.
Capital costs are the first costs of
nuclear energy. The successful Connecticut Yankee nuclear plant was ,
in 1962, contracted at a price of $180
per kilowatt of capacity, i.e., the construction of the plant would cost
$180 per kilowatt of electricity generated at maximum load. A coal
plant, contracted in 1962, would
have cost $150 per installed kilowatt of capacity. Prices for nuclear
plants were set by "turnkey" contracts under which the builders of
the reactors took full responsibility
for designing and building the
plant, including any subsequent actions necessary to meet regulatory
guidelines. For Westinghouse as
well as General Electric, turnkey
contracts were a financial disaster.
However, coal plants cost more to
operate than nuclear plants, and by
the early 70s, nuclear plants were
at least cost-competitive with coal
in the eyes of the utility companies.
For the consumer, a more relevant
figure is the price which he pays for
electricity. The public service commission of each state sets rates for
consumers based on a certain maximum p ercentage rate of return on
capital invested, i.e., the stockholder's equity. The more equity a

utility has, the greater its p rofits.
This does not, of course, mean th at
there is a higher rate of return on
capital invested, but th at there is
a larger base on which to calcul ate
profits. Fuel costs are part of operating costs and thus are not figured
into the return on investments. All
other things being equal, then, the
higher the amount of capital invested, the larger the amount th e
consumer pays for electricity.
All other things are not equ al in
the case of nuclear power versus
coal. Until recently, refined and enriched uranium cost $7 a pound , bu t
this price zoomed pas t $55 per
pound last year. Some fi n ancia l
analysts expect uranium to go u p to
$100 per pound soon, the price at
which fuel costs for coal and nuclear
plants will break even. Ot h er
analysts even predict that refined
uranium wi ll go to $200-$300 a
pound by 1985. Coal has increased
in price too- but not near! y as
rapidly as uranium .
In the past, nuclear p lants cost
somewhat more to build but less to
operate than coal p lants, bu t that
has changed in the last severa l
years . Rapidly acce l erating con struction costs for nuclear plan tsapproximately an 18 to 22 per cent
annual increase-have made them
substantially more expens i ve to
build than coal p lants. These costs
are projected to accelerate more
rapidly than the costs of coal p lants,
and the gap will widen. For nuclear
plants built since 1975, the cos t
equaled and now exceeds the cost
of coal-fired p lants. A recent Exxon
study shows that a 1000 megawatt
coal plant with desu l fu rization
equipment begun in 1976 would cost
$335 million less to build than a nu clear power p lant of the sam e size.
It also shows that this coal p l an t
would cost 5.11 cents per kilowatt
hour to operate compared to 5.07
cents for a nuclear plant.
What the Exxon study does not
include are the huge government
subsidies to nuclear energy, a "hid11

den" cost to the consumer. These
subsidies range from basic nuclear
research to government regulation
and insurance. Batelle Institute has
estimated that the research and development costs for nuclear plants
have been $18 billion to date. This
amount, if it were not paid for by
the taxpayer and were instead included in the electricity rate, would
have raised the cost of nuclear generated electricity by 2 cents per kilowatt hour. Add to this research and
development subsidy such other
subsidies as state and local evacuation plans, subsidies for uranium
enrichment, and accelerated depreciation allowances and tax credits,
and the cost of that electricity goes
still higher. Finally, add on the subsidy to nuclear utilities which the
Price-Anderson Act, passed in 1957,
contributes to nuclear power. This
legislation relieved the nuclear industry of serious liability costs.
Limiting liability to $560 million
for any one accident for which the
government pays a substantial share,
the Price-Anderson Act considerably eases the insurance costs to the
utilities. Since property damage
alone could reach $17 billion in a
severe nuclear accident, this limited liability is a huge subsidy for
nuclear power. All these subsidies
decrease the cost of nuclear electricity but increase taxes.
Two other costs not included in
electricity rates are those for nuclear
waste disposal and decommissioning
plants which have outlived their
usefulness. Waste disposal research
is being carried out by the Department of Energy. Wastes are presently being stored on site in pools
of water in nuclear plants or are sent
to "temporary" waste disposal sites.
Safe permanent disposal, although
theoretically feasible but not presently practicable, may be a reality by
1995-if all goes as planned and political resistance is overcome. The
entire costs of permanent disposal
sites are not included in present
rates and will have to be paid for by
nuclear electricity users when and
if permanent storage sites are feasible.
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Finally, the cost of decommissioning the nuclear plants awaits future
generations. The true costs of carrying out this task are also not included in electrical rates present! y
charged by utility companies. Decommissioning cost estimates range
from 3 per cent of construction
costs-welding the doors shut and
posting armed guards-to 100 per
cent of construction costs-dismantling the irradiated structural
materials and conveying them to the
disposal sites. Nuclear plants have a
relatively short life of twenty to
forty years, so it is our children who
will pay for decommissioning the
plants we build.
When nuclear energy does not
turn out to be the panacea its advocates would lead us to believe, the
question goes up: "But what will we
do for energy?" An answer easy to
give in the abstract is solar energy,
but we must also question the immediate practicality of that alternative.

A problem of our energy
future is: Who will be
sufficently employed to
pay for our energy costs?
Here the future is brighter, but
not without some clouds. It will take
time to implement the solar alternative, and part of the solar alternative must include responsible uses
of present energies while the solar
alternative is explored. Among
these interim measures are conservation, co-generation, and rate restructuring. To encourage conservation, rates could be changed so
that large electricity users would pay
as much for each additional kilowat instead of less, which is the present situation. "Cheap" electricity
for large users does not encourage
conservation. Coupled to this rate
restructuring might be a "lifeline"
program which supplies electricity
at low rates to consumers who use
smaller amounts, possibly less than
500 kilowatts per month. Another
complementary measure to these
conservation measures is peak load

pncmg. By increasing prices for
electricity at times of peak demand,
consumers would be encouraged to
use electricity for many uses at offpeak times. Since it is peak demand
which is the crucial factor in determining the need for new generators, these rate changes might help
even out demand and decrease the
need for new electricity. Some of
these measures have been implemented in a few places. While total
energy demand has not decreased,
it has not increased as fast as the
original projections made by the
utilities and the federal government.
Decreased rates of growth in energy
usage can be further supported by
more energy efficient equipmentbetter insulated refrigerators and
water heaters, heat pumps for heating and cooling, more efficient electric motors, etc.
Industrial co-generation of electricity can supply some of the demand for energy while solar alternatives are developed. A Dow
Chemical Corporation study reports
that co-generation could supply half
of our industrial needs by 1985. Cogeneration is the use of the waste
heat from heat-producing processes
for the generation of electricity.
The steel industry, for example,
is in a position to produce more electricity than at present by generating
it from the heat released in the coking and smelting process.
Co-generation in the home is also
possible. By using a motor running
on natural gas or alcohol, heat and
electricity could be produced for the
home at a lower cost than is charged
by many utilities. Other electrical
demands can eventually be met by
using photovoltaic cells. Although
very costly at present, increasing
use of them will bring down their
price until they become competitive with other forms of energy.
Breakthroughs in technology- principally in lowering the cost of silicon, the basic ingredient m the
cells-have already begun at the
Stanford Research Institute.
Any particular combination of alternatives to nuclear energy while
the solar energy alternative is deThe Cresset

veloped would depend on local
characteristics. For example,
a highly industrialized region such
as northwest Indiana would depend
more on industrial co-generation
than a farming area in central Indiana. The latter region might use
alcohol or methane produced from
agricultural waste to power home cogeneration units. Other regions
must explore their own alternatives,
e.g., coastal regions can explore the
use of ocean temperature differences as part of their regional energy production pattern.
We must, I believe, always think
in terms of energy combinations.
One of the problems of renewable
energy options is their dependence
on fluctuating processes, e.g., sunlight and wind. By using combinations of these renewable resources,
most of these problems can be overcome. It must be admitted that storage of energy from renewable
sources is presently very costly, and
that problem is currently being researched. One possible solution may
be a fuel cell using hydrogen and
oxygen to produce electricity. But,
in addition to being renewable,
many of the alternatives to nuclear
power plants have the additional
virtue of being more labor intensive
than nuclear plants. Once the initial
surge of employment for construction is over, less than one hundred people operate a plant. For
solar energy, conservation, and cogeneration, nearly four times more
people would be employed in the installation and maintenance of these
energy alternatives per dollar of
capital investment. One problem of
our energy future is who will be
sufficiently employed to pay for
our energy costs!
For my part, I conclude that nuclear power is not economically feasible. My argument makes no direct
appeal to the grave dangers of nuclear power, though I do not discount them . Moral arguments
coupled with economic arguments,
however, make a strong combination for those who oppose nuclear
power and seek to promote the alter~tiva.
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The Higher Meaning
of John Wayne
Searching for
The Searcher
James Combs

What does one say about John
Wayne that has not already been
said?
The eulogies abounded when he
died last summer. "John Wayne was
bigger than life," said President Carter. "John Wayne is America," said
Elizabeth Taylor, the wife of a wellknown Senator from Virginia, when
she testified before Congress in behalf of a special medal struck for
Wayne when it was known he was
dying. Jack Valenti, President of the
Motion Picture Association of America, opined, "the tallest tree in the
movie forest has just been felled."
Other people were not so kind:
boor, reactionary, superpatriot, studio war hero, machoman, boozer,
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anachronism. Perhaps the exploiting pop magazines that were issued
just days after his death were most
correct: "Last of the Westerners,"
"Symbol of American Heroism,"
"The Duke of Wide Open Spaces."
It is curious how much more incisive were those who wanted to make
a quick buck off of the Duke's death
than those who loved him and those
who hated him.
I feel that those who knew him
personally or were linked to the
movie establishment felt too kindly
about him, and those who didn't
know him or were situated in antiestablishment circles tended to feel
too harshly toward him. The slick
airport bookstall mags understood
him for us. He was the people's
icon, a representative of the myths,
ideals, and instincts we commonly
feel. He exemplified the central
myth we have created as a people,
The West. As a Westerner he enacted the popular ideal of correct behavior- courageous, inner-directed,
self-reliant, strong- and he responded directly, unreflectively, often
violently, to situations. My God,
how much we would love to do that!
It was Marion Michael Morrison
(his real name) who died last summer, and it was that movie star who
was extolled or condemned, because he and they confused the person and the persona, the man and
the symbol. What we knew in the
dark, John Wayne, lives on.
John Wayne was indeed an anachronism, although not for his political
beliefs or lifestyle; one has only to
live in a small Southern or Midwestern town for awhile (or for that
matter on a university faculty) to
see plenty of that. The anachronism
was what he created, his masterpiece, the icon itself, John Wayne.
He has told us how he made up "the
John Wayne thing" in front of a mirror before starring in The Big Trail
(1930). Wayne was perhaps the last
representative of that type of popular creativity: developing a rather
"flat" movie persona and sticking to
it. The successes of his generation
who did that always represented,
were an icon of, some important

13

social type: Spencer Tracy as the
Man of Integrity, Jimmy Stewart as
the Innocent Abroad, Bogart as The
Tough Man of the World, Katherine
Hepburn as the Feisty Aristocrat.
That Wayne's icon survived them
all is not so much a physical as a
mythical thing: the Western drama
is burned into our national consciousness, and Wayne's personification of it is inextricably linked to
that drama. Others preceded himWilliam S. Hart, Gary Cooper- but
no one will likely succeed him.
Indeed, as several writers have
pointed out, it was precisely his
anachronistic iconography that gave
him his power and his charm. He
was a throwback, unreflective, active, self-assured, combative. He
was what we believe we were in a
mythic Heroic Age, in our most
tough-minded and self-confident
manifestation. If Manifest Destiny
was not the palest of the gods, then
one should not expect the recreated
heroes of such an age to be Woody
Aliens. Yet, as Terry Curtis Fox
pointed out in Film Comment,
Wayne at his best was in conflict with
change, with modernity, with compromises and relativism. He acted
on moral absolutes in a world in
which others had neither the stomach nor the independence to follow
through on them. He enacted the
ultimate democratic myth: the moral
authority of the independent individual, in conflict with society,
change, and even his own best interests.

Wayne at his best was in
conflict with modernity,
change, and relativism .
And, yes, he depicted a man of
violence. Heroic Ages are always
peopled by men of violence; Achilles and Siegfried, after all, manage
to spill a good bit of blood. What
makes an age heroic is precisely that
things are unsettled, evil is unchecked, the world is not yet made.
The Wayne figure in the West settles
things, checks evil, and ironically
makes himself obsolete by creating
the conditions of civilized society.
14

Violence is purposeful, climactic,
successful, and thus makes violence,
and its perpetuators (both good and
evil), obsolete. Civilization is a result of the heroic struggle, but the
attendant norms and practices render the free spirits, the men of the
West, bad for business, garden clubs,
and church attendance. Like James
Fenimore Cooper's Natty Bumppo,
the Wayne of films such as The Man
Who Shot Liberty Valance is a supplanted figure, a man on the fringe
of change, a hero, like Bumppo, who
serves civilized society but is apart
from it. Wayne is the last great representation of the frontier individualist who is so much a part of our
"usable past": the dangerous, not
quite respectable, totally self-contained man of action, who doesn't
need society, but society needs him
for a moment and then no more.

"The Man of the West" is
bad for business, garden
clubs, and churchgoing.
Perhaps this imaginative basis for
Wayne's career was never better expressed than in the role of Ethan
Edwards in John Ford's The Searchers. Wayne plays a mysterious figure who returns to, but is outside of,
a family in the West. Most of the
family is killed in an Indian raid,
but his niece is kidnapped. Relentlessly, obsessively, he searches for
her, first to rescue her, but as she
passes puberty, to kill her. Once
found, she doesn't want to be rescued, and in what one current director calls "the single most harrowing
moment in film," Wayne captures
her, but rather than killing her, lifts
her and takes her home. Wayne believed this his. greatest role, and apparently the current crop of young
Hollywood directors (Spielberg,
Scorsese, Milius, Schrader, etc.) are
obsessed by and continually use the
basic plot of The Searchers: films
such as Taxi Driver, Hardcore, The
Deer Hunter, even Star Wars appear to have been influenced by it.
Why so? Some of it appears to
stem from Wayne's mythological
status, and from his ability (with

directors like Ford and Hawks) to
transcend the mere "horse opera"
aspects of the movie Western and
create iconic figures of memorable
style and economy: Mr. Dunson of
Red River, Tom Doniphon of Liberty Valance, Rooster Cogburn of
True Grit. But it is in The Searchers
that the quintessential frontier figure is taken to its full dramatic possibilities, and the terrible power of
American freedom and violence
captured in all of its tension and
contradiction. And why, may we
ask, does this enactment move us so
much now?
Perhaps it is because of our current search, like Wayne's search for
the little girl, for something dear
that we lost. And perhaps it is because of our current fears that what
we have created will reject us; that
the winds of change endanger primal bonds of community; and that
our "mission" has somehow changed
along the way from something noble
to something destructive and even
pathological. George McGovern's
"Come home, America" speech and
Carter's "crisis of confidence" drama both indicate that something has
been lost and "the search" is still on.
The West of mythology and characters such as Wayne gave us a popular formula for the enactment of
moral dilemmas and social conflicts,
and in their most magnificent treatments, the films of Wayne reflected
much of what it means to be an American. Perhaps the Congressional
medal inscribed "John Wayne,
American" said more than its initiators knew. Perhaps, too, as we enjoy
and study the best of Wayne in the
future, we will discover, as the new
directors discovered with The
Searchers, that Wayne knew more
than his detractors, or even he,
knew. Mythological knowledge is a
cultural "higher meaning" that
transcends even the people who are
the popular icons of the myth, and
the iconography itself has a life that
is truly larger than life. Marion
Michael Morrison dies, but, for good
or ill, the cultural artifact that he
and we created, John Wayne, lives
on. That's right, pilgrim.
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The Rights of the Mentally Ill
And Community Responsibility
In every age one can find instances of helpful humane treatment of the troubled which was guided
by available knowledge and enlightened by a religious or philosophical affirmation of the world.
In every age.one can also find instances of fearful, self-protective treatment
which was / not illuminated, but shado w-lighted by t he dark beam of magic.

In order to be able to say what rights and responsibilities a person has because of a particular status he
has, a role he plays, or a condition he is in , we have to
know what that status, role, or condition is. To make a
statement of the rights of the mentally ill requires that
we know what mental illness is and how it affects a person's civic, social, and human status. Definition of the
responsibilities of mental health workers and of the
community presupposes that we know what sort of
training and experience are required to produce a competent mental health professional and what it means
to be a human being and a member of a community.
You would think that we at least know what a citizen
and a civil society are; but even about this there is a
good deal of confusion. Some people, holding a very
individualistic philosophy, think that civil society is
just a collection of individuals each of whom should
follow his own interest as he sees it. They see that we
do have a common interest in defense against foreign
enemies and in police protection of our own persons
and property. They agree that one may help the needy
out of a private sense of generosity. But according to
such individualists, there is no public duty to people
who are not competent to shift for themselves.
On the other hand, there are more communityminded people who thinl:. that we are parts of each
other. What affects some of us reflects on us all, they
think; for we are interdependent within a whole context which we can only partly control. Even the endowments which nurturing surroundings have granted us
as individuals, we often get at the expense of others.
Our greatest obligation, such people would say, is to
maintain a humane community. That entails a care for
those whom nature or their personal histories have
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provided with inadequate abilities to provide for themselves.
It is easy to see that these two opposed philosophies
have different conceptions of what a human being and
his value are. The different beliefs do not just exist
in the abstract. They are held by real people and
groups who operate in society. There are important
questions, consequently, about the rights and permissions of divergent groups to act on their beliefs as well
as of the duties which the political society may require
of them .
Meanwhile, regarding mental illness, the confusion
goes deeper still. The term "mental illness" is
commonly made to cover almost everyone who is for
some reason or other not fully competent to manage
his own life in an adjustment which the people around
him find satisfactory. Thus, people who suffer from
mental retardation, people with disease-produced dysfunctions, people with hysterical responses to traumatic
experiences, people who commit violent crimes, people who have simply made ineffective adjustments to
very difficult life situations, and even people in whom
normal aging has dimmed the faculties are all too often
lumped together under the category of "mentally ill."
In a few cases, the causes and characteristic patterns
of deviant behavior are known. Paresis due to syphillis is diagnosable in much the same way as any other
spirochete-caused disease. Down's syndrome is clearly
related to the number and disjunctions of chromosomes. Cretinism is a result of dietary iodine lack or
thyroidal dysfunction and can be treated with iodine
or thyroxin if caught early enough. But, for the most
part, we have to say there is no definitive knowledge,
nor general agreement, on what mental illness is, nor
on what constitutes proper and adequate training for
a psychotherapist.
Yet the fact is that several different groups of professionals and nonprofessionals have convinced the
public that they have the expertise required to recognize mental illness, diagnose its type and cause, determine when a person should be institutionalized, to perform radical therapy, and to determine when the patient is cured or can be released.
Acceptance of such claims by the courts and the public
exists side by side with newspaper exposes and legal
complaints about the conduct of workers in state hos-
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pitals and about qu estionable commitments to institutions that might well lead to distrust and lack of confidence in the mental health system. It forgets the long
history of mistreatment of people with deviant behavior
that might well lead to fear of giving too much power
to mental health professionals and institutions.
It is from this whole situation that concern for the
legal rights of persons held to be mentally ill and for
the responsibilities of the community arises. Hence, it
is to that situation in part that our discussion must be
addressed. In part also , however, the policy issues arise
from the real condition that terms like "mental illness"
are intended to label. It is a fact, after all , some people
become internally incapable of coping with their lives,
that some do develop deviant personalities and do exh ibit behavior that is not just eccentric, but markedly
deviant. They sometimes do harm to themselves and
others in such ways as to lead us to believe they have
not rationally chosen to do so. They do sometimes become uncontrollabl e by the ordinary social forces of
habit and public opinion. The questions then arise
what the responsibilities of the public and the professions are to such people, whether there is a social, human, or moral responsibility to them which goes beyond the prudent and legal , and conversely what
r ights, if any, they retain as citizens and as human
beings against our intervention .
We cannot here deal with all the p roblems which
arise in controversies about mental ill ness; but the original one remains with us. If we citizens do not know
what mental illness is and how it should be treated,
how can we get started on questions of rights and responsibilities? All we would be able to talk about is
some very general responsibi lities, like the true, but
indefinite, duty to further the welfare of others when
we can. Without some knowledge of mental
illness, we cannot apply even these accepted moral values to particular cases. We wi ll not, for example, know
what will harm or help a mentall y ill person.
I think the answer to our question is that we do know
just enough about the nature of mental illness to be
able to determine the main legal safeguards and the
main human and public responses proper to the mentally ill. In order to say what it is that we know, I want
very briefly to give a somewhat different version of the
history of the treatment of mental illness than one
usually hears. The popu lar version which one finds in
textbooks of clinical psychology and psychopathology
has it that in ancient times people believed in spirits
and demons who were able to disrupt the natural order
with magic and who served forces which had other purposes than our own . Demented people had a demon
within them who controlled th em and made them do
things they would not ordinarily do. A person who had
one was not only dangerous; he was evil and immoral.
As the orthodox history has it, the ancients were barbaric and cruel in their treatment of the insane. They
thought that the possessed maniac must be driven out
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of society where he would be harmless, or treated so
cruelly th at the demon would find his bod y too uncomfortable to inhabit. In modern times, so the story goes,
we have overcome such primitive barbarity. Our recent history is one of steady progress in scientific
knowledge and humanitarian sentiment.
This version of the history in effect gives a justification for diagnosis and treatments of the mentally ill
which can be identified as scientific and rejects what it
interprets as survivals of primitive ignorance. But I
want to suggest that the available data su pport another
more plausible interpretation and justify some different treatments of the mentally troubled. It is of course
true that the ancients had not developed the scientific
technology that we have now. Bu t it is not at all the
case that they were simply barbarous. Rather, in every
age you can find instances of helpful humane treatment of the troubled which was guided by the available knowledge and enlightened by a religious
or philosophical affirmation of the world. In every age
you can also find instances of fearful, self-protective
treatment which was not illuminated, but shadowlighted, by the dark beam of magic.

Jesus found mental illness to be a sign
of sin, but his cure was not punishment.
He restored the afflicted to God and to
the community. This didn't mean adapting
to a law-ridden, self-protective society;
rather, it meant a rebirth into freedom .
I will not pretend to give a complete historical
account of this. I will just point to a few important
facts and then give an interpretation of the philosophic views they might reflect. These will be views
people have of a world in which suffering, disease, and
evil are stark realities. They imply beliefs about the
values and ideals we have for ourselves and others,
and about the kinds of practice which are consistent
with our beliefs.
First, then, the ancients did believe in spirits; but in
each culture that I know anything about at least, there
have been a couple of different kinds of belief about
them. Some people did think those possessed were
wicked and shou ld be punished. Other people thought
of demons as entities much like persons but with
magical powers. By "magic" I here mean a non-natural
power to do physical and mental feats more or less instantaneously without going through a temporal process involving work. Believers in such magic were naturally enough ready also to believe in magicians who
could with secret formu las cast out one demon with
the help of another. Kings insecure on their thrones
had such sorcerers around, but wizards hired their
powers out to others, too, when the price was right and
proper homage was paid them.
In those same times, however, there were other people who thought of the demon as the spirit of man or
Th e Cress et

the divine spark within him. Their experience led
them to believe, as I believe our experience still teaches
us, that neither purely mechanistic, physico-chemical,
nor magical explanations are adequate for many events
and for many aspects of human life, and that one must
think of human beings as distinctly different from the
rest of nature. The demon was for them that which
makes us uniquely human and lifts us to our highest
heights. Sometimes the demon was thought to be reason, in which we shared, but which went beyond our
own capacities to include the motive power of the universe. Sometimes it was thought of in more religious
terms as the spirit which men share with the gods or
with God and through which our minds are illuminated and given hope and courage. In any case,
for these people, if some were "possessed by demons,"
they were very human demons, and what you did about
them was to treat the people who had them like distressed human beings.
Thus, there were ancient Egyptian "hospices" and
temples in which physician-priests augmented prayers
and incantations with kindness, advice, recreation, and
herbs. Greek Asclepiad temples of the eighth century
B.C. were located in remote regions, away from family,
trade, war, and stress. There sick were comforted, fed,
bathed, massaged, and given nepenthic drugs. Pythagoras in the sixth century B.C. urged paying attention to
prevention rather than cure.
Jesus, confronting an outcast, dangerous lunatic who
was said to be possessed of unclean spirits in Mark's
Gospel, cured him not by the use of a magic formula,
but by speaking to the demons in the man and then by
leading the man out of the cemetery, where he was
living with swine, into the open fields and sunshine
and normal human intercourse.
Jesus found lunacy and other sicknesses to be a manifestation of sin; but the cure was not through judgment
and punishment. Rather, it was through relieving the
afflicted one of his guilt and restoring him to a right
relationship with his life and the life of the community.
The cure was a sign of the presence of God; but being
right with God didn't just mean making an adaptive
adjustment to a self-protective, law-ridden society. It
meant a re-birth into freedom and ability to cope
autonomously with the sometimes tough problems of
life. Finally, even in what are referred to as the Dark
Ages, medieval monasteries were frequently a refuge
for fools and lunatics-a place where kind treatment
was combined with relic-touching, holy water, and a
mild sort of exorcism through prayer.
The point to my little history is that is is not belief
in demons and spirits and inhumane treatment of the
insane, on the one hand, nor belief in drugs, neurosurgery and kindly care, on the other, which separates
the ancient and bad from the modern and good in the
ways of caring for mental health. What separates the
bad and good at the practical level is, to be sure, the
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way in which one approaches those whose spirits are
troubled. But what motivates that approach is the way
in which one conceives human-being-in-the-world and
the way one conceives the relation between knowledge
and the power to act. My history illustrates different
conceptions of h u man life, different beliefs about the
kind of knowledge which is available to us, different
appraisals of the value of a human being and consequent differences in approach to therapy.
My claim is that two broadly different ideas of these
things are as present in our own day as they were in
ancient Egypt or Greece or at the dawn of the Christian era. The first I'll label for convenience the "Gnostic." In the gnostic myth nature and man are a theatre
in which forces beyond our ken struggle for ascendancy. The everyday social world and the world of nature are captives of Satanic powers that would enslave
people. Our aim is to escape the evil and save ourselves from it. We can do it by isolating the evil and
trying to overcome it by violence. Or we can go to the
magicians who have a secret password that will get us
through the enemy's lines and take us to salvation.

It is not belief in demons, spirits, and the
inhumane treatment of the insane on the one
hand, nor belief in drugs, neurosurgery, and
kindly care on the other hand which separates
the ancient and bad from the modern and good
in the ways of caring for mental health.
When you take a contemporary analog of this view
as a citizen, your reaction to the mentally ill is just selfprotective. You confine them and you don't let them
back into society, and you probably paint all forms of
deviant behavior with the same brush, calling them insane and evil. And you probably abdicate responsibility for determing the password, or the nature of
mental illness and the effectiveness of therapeutic
means, to the physician with the latest theory. If you
take this view as a patient, you play the crazy game,
thinking of yourself as bad but as not under your own
control. You refuse responsibility for yourself and put
yourself hopelessly, but submissively, into the hands of
the magician. Mental health professionals who fall into
this way of thinking, fall into the danger of becoming
part of an entrenched guild whose authority derives
from star-spangled robes and magic wands. They may
then assume an authority they do not have and claim
an arcane knowledge of a disease that doesn't exist or
of a cure that does more harm than the disease.
A variation of the Gnostic conception appears in a
way to be its antithesis. Again for convenience, I will
label it the "Technical." I did not specifically illustrate
it in my history, though it, too, appears in every age.
It rejects all talk of other than mechanical or physical
influences on personality or behavior. Nature and man,
on this view, are intrinsically value-neutral. They are
simply material organisms which adjust to each other
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in ordered, happy ways, or collide violently and produce pain. The aim of ther ap y is to alleviate pain and
return the organism to the functions determined for it
by the fixed laws of nature.
The danger when one takes this view, of course, is
that he simply writes off all those people for whom no
cure on the physical model is known. The further danger is that one takes them as l ess than hum an and
therefore gives them no more care than will satisfy the
most basic physical needs. The parallel with Gnosticism lies in the relation of the patient and the professional therapist. Once the phsyican convinces the patient or his proxy that he knows the ends to be achieved
and the chemical or neurosurgical means by which to
achieve them, the patient must simply submit to the
manipulations of the expert, who is beyond criticism.
The second main view I do not have a handy label
for, though I do think of it as a Christian one. It accepts
humanity as part of nature but recognizes that the psychic and the social life which are essential parts of being human introduce complexities which are beyond
those which need be considered in the relations of material bodies. It does not close out the possibility that
there are forces at work in our lives which are, now or
forever, beyond our ability to recognize. It does recognize that there are things radically wrong with our
everyday human world, but it denies that human life
or human kind are irrevocably bad. Possibilities of disease and other evils are always there, but so are possibilities that they can be overcome if, on the one hand,
we keep faith with nature, with each other, with that
which makes us to be most fully human, and with God;
and if, on the other hand, we persistently refuse to
deify our claim to favored status, our knowledge of
pet theories, our luxuries, our power and position. It
is the idolatry of just such things that leads to most of
the serious problems in living which our society has.
The chief value, on this world-and-lif~-affirming
view, is not simply a self-protective escape from evil.
It is an affirmation of the importance of our own commitment to wrestling with the evils to see what can be
done about them. Further, it is not just a feeling of
benevolence to our fellowmen. It is our own active participation in an ongoing community response to the
miseries we share.
That commitment carries other values in train. We
won't look for magical solutions ; but we will search
for publicly communicable knowledge about the reasons and solutions of whatever can properly be called
"mental" problems. We will strive for greater clarity
in the concept of mental illness as opposed to non-sick
forms of deviance or kinds of "psychological" difficulties which are not effects of physiological disease. One
of the things that being human means is desiring to
act on the basis of what is true. That motivates support
of the search for knowledge. It should also motivate
an interest in not harming anyone by claiming expertise where reliable knowledge has not been developed.
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Now I think this account provides four principles,
or premises, that we can apply to get to the question of
the rights of the mentally ill and community responsibility. First of all , all the theories of. the causes of mental illness from demon possession to neural dysfunction
agree that mentally ill persons are to some degree,
greater or less, incapable of coping with problems in
living. Further, they agree that in some, but not all,
cases, the mentally ill are to some degree non-responsible for, or have an impaired sense of responsibility for
their actions. There is no reason, however, to think
that either of these difficulties robs them of their basic
status as human beings and persons. Hence, their status
as human beings must be preserved.

The first responsibility of the community is
to be a community, persons tied together by
the internal bond of humane values and norms.
One cannot quite call it a legal duty, for
it cannot be translated into laws. Perhaps
one has to say it is an unrealizable ideal.
To be a person and human means that one has a
right to as much autonomy as one is capable of exercising in the choice of one's principles, one's personality, and what is done to one. A person may never
morally be made a mere object for manipulation by
another without his intelligent consent and without
regard to the condition of his continuing consent.
To be human, furthermore, requires that one respect
and have a care to help implement others' desires for
themselves so far as that is morally possible and one's
relation to them permits. Being human does not, however, entail either that you have perfect wisdom nor
that you must always sacrifice your own legitimate interests to those of others.
My second premise is that we do not have adequate
knowledge of even the behavioral syndromes of mental
illnesses to be able to say for certain who is mentally
ill and who is not even in the phenomenological sense
of his being unable to cope with the realities of life and
being non-responsible for his behavior. We certainly do
not have much reliable scientific knowledge of the
causes of such behavior nor of the whole effect of many
of the forms of treatment that are used . My final premise
is that we should affirm the world as it is and ourselves
as parts of it and interdependent with others in it. Part
of our job of living in the world is to struggle with evil
actively and to open ourselves up to the consequences
of doing so.
Some applications to mentally ill persons are almost
immediate. First, they retain their right of autonomy
until they use it destructively or until they so completely lose their ability to function that they cannot
care for themselves. In the latter case, we owe them as
humane a kind of care as our knowledge makes possible
and our circumstances permit. Where a person suffering a mental disorder injures no one and retains a deThe Cresset

gree of autonomy, it is within his freedom to choose to
seek help or not. If he chooses to seek help, he has a
right to participate in the assessment of his problems
and choosing the treatment for them. He retains the
right to terminate treatment at his own will. Certainly,
he has the right not to be subjected to treatments which
have consequences which he could not reasonably be
thought, were he in his right mind, to choose.
If the person is dangerous to others, society has a
right to protect itself from harm. The right of self-protection, however, does not entail the right of society to
punish or mistreat the mentally ill person; nor does it
entail the right to use him as a research subject against
his will. This follows both from the dignity he retains
and from our lack of knowledge of the causes of his ailment and the consequences of intervention. Expert
opinion cannot impose confinement or treatment on
him. -Liberty is a moral and political or legal category,
not a medical one. Hence, a person has a right not to be
restrained without a public judgment of the justice of
the restraint; that is, in emergencies, by a law officer
acting within the limits of his office, and otherwise by a
court with rights of appeal. Conversely, the public in
estimating its safety does have the right to make a reasonable estimate of the need for confinement and the
probable effects of terminating confinement.
Finally, while a patient can in no way surrender his
right to decide not to be given psychiatric treatment, he
cannot be said to have an absolute right to such treatment. This follows both from the lack of adequate
knowledge of what a suitable treatment would be and
from the fact that the treatment is a public act which also
has costs and consequences. In that case, it is the public's responsibility to determine its own priorities.
Now, what follows from our premises about the rights
and duties of mental health professionals? First, they are
not magicians. They can neither form an autonomous
organization of men and women with professedly arcane
secrets nor can they be drafted as magicians in the court
of the king, to do his dirty work, so to speak. They may
serve as expert witnesses in a very limited sphere or as
friends of the court, but they can neither be expected
nor allowed to make unilateral decisions about confinement or treatment. A commitment to retain a respect
for the patient as a human person, to do nothing to him
without consent which is as intelligent as possible, and
to claim no professional authority for a treatment which
is not known to be beneficial: these I think are implicit
in one's undertaking to use one's knowledge and skill
for the welfare of another.
Professionals are obligated to a continual search
which is capable of public communicability, open to
public scrutiny, and communicable to students in a justifiable educative process for verifiable new knowledge.
Most importantly, the judgment as to what constitutes
beneficial as opposed to maleficent treatment is not a
technical-scientific judgment. What constitutes psychological or mental and spiritual well-functioning and
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well-being depends on the deepest moral, philosophical,
and religious considerations. Mental health professionals must be sensitively aware of this aspect of every
clinical and experimental judgment that is made and
must realize their responsibility to their clients and society-indeed, to mankind-in such judgments.
Conversely, such professionals must be protected
from the demand for a perfection which does not exist.
Every application even of verified knowledge requires
judgment. Physicians as human beings are as subject to
the effects of stress, pressure, and fatigue as anyone else.
What can be required is that they accept, nay, seek, reliable controls on their decision processes and have their
actions as open to qualified review as any others who
perform public or economic services.
Part of our job of living in the world is
t o str uggle with evil actively and to.open
our selves to the consequences. To increase
t he welfare of the needy is more than a matter
of pri vate charity. lt is a public duty, for
t he need is due in part to social conditions.

Finally, in dealing with guilt, anxiety, or any other
condition which may involve the values and commitments of the patient, when professionals give advice or
recommend courses of action for which their science
does not provide justification, they must make clear
acknowledgement of their own values, ideals, and religious or normative commitments; they must explain to
the patient that at that point they have no more expertise or insight than any other disinterested individual
who has the patient's welfare at heart.
To turn now to the responsibilities of the community,
our premises would tell us that its first responsibility
is to be a community, hence, a group which is tied together by the internal bond of common, humane values
and norms. To be such a community requires continuous reflection on our values and actions and continuous recapturing of the meaning of human life. The
premise that we should affirm the world entails that the
community wrestle with its evils at the human level and
try to do something about them, not escape by hiding
from them and forgetting them nor by dismissing them
to someone else's responsibility. One cannot quite call
it a legal duty to be such a community, because there is
no way of translating it fully into laws. Perhaps you have
to say that it is an unrealizable ideal. Nevertheless, the
ideal is the basis and goal of a fully civil and humane
society.
More specifically, the community must, of course,
petermine its economic and political priorities and
regulate the professions, but it would be a poor society
indeed that spent all its resources on luxuries and died
spiritually from a lack of heart and moral will. Not only
that, but to help increase the welfare of those in need is
not just a matter of private charity. It is a public duty,
for the need itself is created at least in part by social conditions.
Cl
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Valparaiso Uni versity Art Collections
Richard H. W. Brauer

RECENTACQUISinON S

Art illuminates, enhances, expands the experience of living. But
first the experience of art itself must
be made accessible. For that, opportunities to encounter art must be
provided. During 1979, over fifty
works of art were-added to the Valparaiso University Art Collections.
Photographs of a few of these recent
acquisitions are reproduced here
and on the cover of this issue.

Cl

Above: Marek Schwarz, David
and Bathsheba, circa 1930s. Repousse bronze bas-relief, 26'/2 " x
20". Valparaiso University Art Collections, gift of Esther Paul, 1979.
Left: Paul Caponigro, Stonehenge, 1970, black and white photograph, 14" x 11". Valparaiso University Art Collections purchase,
1979. Paul Caponigro was born in
1932 at Boston, studied with Minor
White, and now lives in Santa Fe.
His work often presents mystic interpretations of nature.

Visual Arts Editor of the Cresset and Design Consultant to Stained Glass,
Richard H. W. Brauer is Associate Professor of Art at Valparaiso University and Director of the University Art Galleries and Collections.
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Right: Georges R0uault (18711958), Miserere et Guerre, Plate
53 of Our Lady of the Seven Sorrows
(Virgin of the Seven Swords), published in 1948. Intaglio, 23" x 16".
Valparaiso University Art Collections, gift of Leonard Scheller, 1978.
Rouault, like other major modern
artists, probes the · sufferings of
Christ.
The Cresset
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Concordia 's
Not-So-Contemporary
Look at the Formula
Of Concord

Review Essay
David G. Truemper

A Contemporary Look At
The Formula of Concord
Edited by Robert D. Preus and Wilbert
H. Rosin. St. Loyis: Concordia Publishing House, 1978. Pp. 320. Cloth, $9.95.

The four hundredth anniversary
of the promulgation of the Formula
of Con cord of 1577 has sparked a
good deal of inter est in the document, r efl ected in several conferences and in a number of publications. Many of these publications
h ave borne the Concordia imprint,
and , as is to be expected from a denomination al publishing
house
whose editori al process includes
doctrinal censorship, they tend

David G . Truemper is A ssociate
Professor of Theology at Valparaiso
U niv ersi ty and holds his S. T.D.
from the Luthera n School of Theology at Chicago. A frequ ent editor
of theological do cuments -most recently Confession and Congregation
(Valparaiso University Press) and
the doctrinal and ecclesiastical chapters on Lutheranism in Arthur Carl
Piepkorn :S Profiles in Belief: Volume II (Harp er and Row)-Mr.
Tru emper has bee n appointed Um"versity R esearch Professor at Valparaiso Un iversity f or 1980-1981.
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The packaging of this volume indicates
that it is not meant to be read and used,
but to be bought, looked at, and shelved.
mainly to reflect that theological
stance currently in vogue in the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod.
The present volume is no exception.
Most of the authors are members of
the faculty of the Missouri Synod's
Fort Wayne seminary; two are members of the faculty at other synodical
schools. Two "outsiders" are Henry
P. Hamann of Luther Theological
Seminary, Adelaide, South Australia, and Bjarne Teigen, President
Emeritus of Bethany College, Mankato, Minnesota. With a few notable
exceptions, the theological posture
of the authors is a reflection of the
present vogue in the Missouri
Synod.1
A Contemporary Look at the
Formula of Concord begins with an
extended essay on the historical
background of the Formula and a
very brief statement on the contemporary relevance of the Formula.
These are followed by essays discussing each of the Formula's twelve
articles, including a thirteenth on
the "Rule and Norm of Doctrine"
with which the Formula begins.
The title, however, is misleading,
since the book generally fails to address the Formula from the vantage
point of the contemporary situation
ofthe church. In almost every essay,
the authors strive to restate the argument of the formul ators of the
Formula of Concord, but they usually fail to show how the Formula's
teaching on controverted issues is to
be helpful for the work and witness
and worship of the contemporary
church. The essays are only rarely
"contemporary" in any other sense
than that they happen to have been
written by theologians who are alive
1

The following more or less sta ndard abbreviations are used to refer to the variou s confessional writings : AC for Augsburg Confession, Ap for Apology of the Augsburg
Confession, FC for Formula of Concord .
SO for Solid Declaration . Quotations from
the Book of Concord are made according
to the edition of Theodore G. T appert , Th e
Book of Concord (Philadelphia: Fortress
Press c. 1969).

and working in the twentieth century. In fact, the "look" of most of
the authors is not at all a contemporary look, but a look from the
vantage point of the seventeenth
century's so-called "orthodox" theologians.
Generally, the essays in this volume give evidence of an essentially
ahistorical view both of the confessional writings and of the situation
of the contemporary church. Definitions and formulations from the various articles of the Formula are cited
and asserted as if they could be made
to apply directly to the present time,
as if they were not already historically-conditioned in their original
setting, and as if there were not four
centuries of history between the
original setting and that of the pressent-day church. It seems strange,
then, that the editors should have
sought to produce a volume of essays
that could claim to be a contemporary
look at the Formula of Concord, for
they have given us a volume of essays that are for the most part
neither contemporary in their "look"
nor historical in their method and
awareness. These interpretative essays simply judge and expound the
Formula according to the standard
of contemporary LC-MS ideology,
as we shall see in the article-byarticle analysis which follows .
The editors state their aims in a
significant foreword. While encouraging gratitude for the Formula's
endurance through four centuries,
and while observing that such gratitude "should not contribute to divisiveness or to separation from the
rest of Christendom, the editors'
vision of a gratefully united church
is at best chauvinistic: "The Formula intended to unite, and it could
well become the basis for unity with
all Christians, since it is simply an
exposition of Biblical truths" (p. 10).
The lesson to be learned from the
history of the preparation and promulgation of the Formula "proves
The Cresset

The Church's doctrine is reduced to a museum piece- carefully dusted off and
lovingly displayed- but nowhere shown to engage the contemporary world.
What good is mere correctness if it does not address the human situation?
that faithful reliance on the Scriptures ultimatel y brings the blessing
of religious concord" (p. 10). Therefore it should follow that "a faithful
study of the Holy Scriptures will
lead to harmony and understanding,
though not necessarily to external
unity of all church organizations"
(p. 10). That would be conceivable
only if one were to distinguish between concord or harmony on the
one hand, and unity on the othera distinction severely criticized in
this volume by Kurt Marquart in his
essay on Article X of the Formula.
In any case, editors Preus and Rosin
insist that the Formula "is seriously
being considered as useful for a
genuine ecumenical endeavor" (p . 9) ,
while at the same time presenting it
in such a way as to underscore the
particular emphasis of some in the
Missouri Synod:
T he Formul a is evidence th at th e principle
of sola scriptum, which leads to a n understanding a nd accepta nce of sola fide as
well as sola grat ia was th e binding factor
I which held Protesta ntism togeth er] .
Scriptural a uthority-" Here I sta nd "was th e essenti al principle (p. 9).

It is surely a distortion of confessional theology to assert that trust in the
Scriptures is what produces saving
faith. Yet that is apparently the
opinion of a substantial group of
Missouri's theologians.
In addition to their twisting of the
sola scriptura maxim, the editors
also suggest that the scriptures do
not need sensitive and sophisticated
interpretation. Proper recognition
of the Bible's authority means loyalty to the Bible "as it speaks to the
reader" and without "the interpretation of the 20th-century mind"
(p. 10). Further, they say that only
on the basis of such a view of biblical
authority is any measure of concord
-or unity-to be achieved ; and they
insist that that is the position of the
Formula of Concord!
But perhaps we are expecting too
much. There are some indications
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that this volume is not meant to be
r ead or used, but to be owned or
looked at or shelved. It seems that
form dominates over substance. The
book is printed on heavy, white,
smooth-finish paper, is bound in
brown leather-grain laminated
cloth, and sports on its cover a gold
relief reproduction of a medal struck
for the four hundredth anniversary
of the Augsburg Confession in 1930.
All this packaging is clearly designed to impress the prospective
buyer. But the book's substance only
rarely manages to impress the reader. Typographical errors aboundoccurring, on the average, once in
every four pages. 2 One suspects that
the book has been over-packaged
and under-edited, that it is more for
having than for reading. So it seems,
at least.
Some of the essays deserve a better
fate. The prize for excellence clearly
goes to Robert A. Kolb, professor of
church history at Concordia College, St. Paul, Minnesota, for the
exemplary essay on the "Historical
Background of the Formula of Concord." Kolb is a careful historian
and a lucid writer. His extensive
work on Nikolaus von Amsdorf and
his competent use of archival resources in a number of German libraries have enabled him to write
the history of the concord movement
in a fresh and original way. Instead
2

Typographical errors include these: " Amsdorm " for Am sdorf (p. 31 ), "Flacious" for
Flaciu s (p. 30 ), " Lords' Supper" for Lord's
Supper (p. 4 1), " Chrisoph" for Christoph
(p . 69) , " wil " for will (p. 91 ), "revealved"
for revealed (p. 92). A theologica!ly astute
typesetter may have made a Freudian slip
when setting " Funada mentalists" on p. 92 .
except tha t th e inconsistencies and misspellings in the footnotes are no laughing
ma tter. In additio n, sometimes the names
of people a nd pl aces a re Anglicized, while
a t other times they a re not. So we read
Nuremberg. yet elsewhere Georg and Nikola us; John , yet also Johann . German Um laut sometimes remains , so metimes is repl aced by a n e; we read Munzer , Schwaermer. Chytraeus, Andrea. And is Germany 's
other Frankfurt to be called Fra nkfurt-onthe Oder or Fra nkfurt a n der Oder?

of the rather tendentious views of
that history which have been handed
to generations of seminarians, views
which saw the story as the progressive victory of the good guys (the
Gnesio-Lutherans, led by Flacius
and Gallus) over the bad guys (the
Philippists, led by Melanchthon),
Kolb tells a much more complicated
and carefully-nuanced story of a
move toward concord led by people
who were neither Gnesio-Lutherans
nor Philippists, yet were joined by
moderate members of both those
groups.
As Kolb relates the story, the
movement toward concord was not
simply a theological one, but one
which had (and needed) the active
support of political leaders and
which required careful political negotiations at almost every step of the
way. Further, one sees that neither
of the two warring factions held a
monolithic party line on each debated point. Rather, each faction's
members ranged over a continuum
of opinion, so that moderate members of both groups were able to support the concord moves of Andreae
and the Swabians, and by 1577 all
but the extremes of the two parties
were able to sign their names to the
finished document.
Similarly, Kolb shows that the
Formula was not simply a victory for
the Gnesio-Lutheran position over
the "pussy-footing" and CryptoCalvinism of the Melanchthonian
views. To be sure, the Formula
affirmed the views of the main body of
Gnesio-Lutherans regarding issues involving free will , good works , the Lord 's
Supper, a nd adiaphora. while condemning extreme Flacianists and a GnesioLutheran like Musculus on the one hand
a nd rej ecting Philippist positions across
the board on the other. Some Philippist
concerns were met , but by and large the
condemnations of the Formula are directed against Philippist positions , not against
those of most members of the GnesioLutheran movement , even if its statements were tailored to take account of the
positive viewpoints of the Philippist party
(pp. 86-87 ).
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Teachers of the Church should be expected to function more responsibly than does
this apology for Confessional ism. One will not halt the erosion of Christian faith
by trying to extricate Christian theologians from the web of history and culture.
This more complicated and more
careful assessment marks a considerable advance over the "good guys vs.
bad guys" view that has dominated
much Missouri Synod teaching on
the Formula at least since the publication of the Triglotta in 1922.
In his footnotes Kolb offers a lesson in the historian's art. Nine of
twenty-three pages of footnotes are
Kolb's, providing clues to his sources, pointing to further reading in
areas touched on, and including a
wealth of manuscript materials and
contemporary publications.
Kolb has, of course, developed
this thesis over a period of several
years and in several earlier publications; this essay is clearly dependent
on his earlier work, yet it manages to
tell the story within a relatively brief
compass, so that it can be a valuable
resource for students in colleges and
seminaries. The essay deserves to
be reprinted in pamphlet form so
that it would be readily available
for such use.
Contemporary?

Wilbert H. Rosin, formerly president of Concordia College, Milwaukee, and now dean of the faculty at
the Fort Wayne seminary, spends
six pages in "Looking at the Formu la Today." His essay is a brief for
the idea of a confessional church
"that draws its statements of belief
together in a formal document and
seriously subscribes to them" (p. 88).
In a sketch of some post-Enlightenment trends whose effect he sees to
be the erosion of the Bible as an "infallible guide," Rosin argues that
proper use of the confessional writings will "halt the present-day erosion of Biblical doctrines" (p. 92).
Such proper use calls for "relying on
the Reformation principle of sola
Scriptura , the Bible as the only
source and norm of faith and life"
(p. 92).
In calling the Bible "source and
norm of faith and life" Rosin is not
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writing carefully, and may be merely
sloganizing. Does he really mean
that the Bible is the only source of
faith and life? What has happened to
Jesus' claim to be "the Life"? And
what about the sacraments as signs
of God's gracious will, and thus as
the gospel by which the Spirit creates
faith? Perhaps a closer look at the
Augsburg Confession (ArticleV) or
at the Smalcald Articles (Part Three,
Article IV) would help the author to
a more responsible statement. In
fact, Rosin's slogan is flatly contradictory to the very document his
book is urging us to take seriously.
The Formula of Concord does not
call the Bible the source but rather
"the on! y true norm according to
which all teachers and teachings are
to be judged and evaluated" (SD
Rule and Norm, 3). Though the
change from "only rule and norm"
to "only source and norm" has become common in LC-MS circles at
least since the publication of A Brief
Statement in 1956, it has had disastrous consequences for understanding what the confessions teach about
the Word of God.
Rosin implies that the whole theological enterprise is somehow
above history, detached from the
historical process. He cnticizes
"many" twentieth-century theologians for their "non-traditional"
statements (a curious standard for
one who is arguing for sola Scriptura
and against the authority of such
other factors as tradition!). After
naming Bultman, Barth, the Niebuhrs, Tillich, Teilhard, Rahner,
and Metz as culprits, Rosin observes:

vealed, dropped full-blown from
heaven. In his view the Scriptures
would have to be read as a book of
doctrines or as a kind of textbook of
theology, and not (as the Book of
Concord insists) as God's word of
law and gospel addressed to sinners.
Rosin can claim that he is only enunciating the synod's traditional position . And that's probably correct;
one could find advocates of Rosin's
ahistorical view of Scripture and of
doctrine in much of Missouri's history. But that view has been accompanied also by the more responsible
view of the confessional writers, who
recognized that the ecumenical
creeds were created at particular
times and to refute particular heresies, that they were "achieved
through interaction with the cultural milieu and develop [ed]
through time." If we recall, for example, how the debates over christology raged in the fourth century
and how the non-biblical word homoousios was used to describe the deity
of Christ, we can see that the intellectual and cultural climate indeed
interacted with the formulation of
Christian doctrine! And that has
been true throughout the history of
the church.
Teachers of the Church should be
expected to function more responsibly than does Rosin in this apology
for confessionalism. One will not
halt the erosion of Christian faith
by trying to extricate the work of
Christian theologians from the web
of history and culture.

These and others believed that Christian
doctrine is largely achieved through interaction with the cultural milieu and develops through time. The effect has been
to cut away at the very foundations of the
faith . The polarity between this type of
hum~nisti c theology and revealed [sic]
theology is evident today (p . 92 ).

Harry Huth contributes the essay
"Rule and Norm of Doctrine in the
Formula of Concord," in which he
combines a careful attention to the
details of the text of the Formula
with a rather vigorous insistence
upon reading the Formula in the
light of subsequent theological distinctions from the age of Baroque
neoscholasticism. He argues that the

Rosin thus confuses doctrine and
theology and implies that the doctrine/theology of the Church is re-

Rule and Norm
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The gospel does not need the independent and a priori authority of an
"inerrant scripture." It is surely a distortion of confessional theology
to assert that trust in the scriptures is what produces a saving fa ith.
Formula regards the Scriptures as
the Word of God and therefore as
the authoritative norm for doctrine
and that the Formula itself is likewise a norm according to which doctrine is to be judged. In the process,
Huth marshals some impressive
data as he seeks to answer the question, "What does the term 'Word of
God' mean in the contexts of the
Formula that deal with the rule and
norm of doctrine?" After a meticulous survey of the entire Formula of
Concord, Huth concludes that the
phrase "Word of God" means "gospel" on more than eighty occasions,
that it means "Bible" more than fifty
times, that it refers to the sacramental words of institution on at least
twelve occasions, that it means the
law on eight occasions, and that, in
addition, it occasionally refers either
to Christ or to the Catechisms, to
sermons, or to revelations to the Old
Testament patriarchs.
There is surely no need to challenge those data. It is true that by
1577 "Scripture" and "Word of God"
were more or less interchangeable
terms also outside the Lutheran
camp. Therefore it is highly significant that the authors of the Formula
so successfully preserved the decisive Lutheran insight that the. Scriptures lay claim to being the Word of
God precisely because they bear
witness to Christ by proclaiming the
gospel. According to Huth's statistics, the equation of Word of God
and gospel outweighs the equation
of Word of God and Scripture by a
ratio of approximately 8 to 5! That
is surely indicative of the center of
gravity in the Reformation insight,
namely, that the Scriptures are authoritative for the sake of Christ and
the gospel.
Huth's essay contains another
noteworthy feature. On the basis of
a quotation from John Gerhard,
Huth suggests that the Formula is to
be understood according to the
seventeenth century dogmatic disFebruary, 1980

tinction between the causative and
the normative authority of Scripture. And he regularly inserts such
favorite words of the later dogmaticians as "inerrant" and "infallible"
as if they were also a major part of
the Formula's arsenal of adjectives
regarding the Bible. But they are
not. Huth can cite only the Preface
to the Book of Concord for the use of
the word "infallible," and in both
instances there it is used not to
modify "Bible;· but "Word of God"
and "truth of the Word of God," respectively. Now, it is no crime to use
subsequent distinctions and term~n
ology to describe a document's sense;
but it is less than helpful to imply
that those subsequent distinctions
and terms bear the same connotations for a 1577 document as they
bear in the writings of theologians
two (or ten) generations later. It
seems to this reviewer that Huth's
procedure, like Rosin's, detaches
theology from the human , historical
situation and teaches the church to
treat the Scriptures as a source of
timeless truth instead of as the original and apostolic witness to the gospel, which stands or falls with the
crucified and risen Jesus and does
not need independent and a priori
authority as "inerrant Scripture."
Finally, since the Formula's section on "Rule and Norm" makes
some remarkable statements about
authority in and for the church, it
would have been helpful for A Contemporary Look at the Formula of
Concord if Huth had addressed the
genuinely contemporary crisis of
authority in the church by means of
a broader discussion of the Formula's view of authority . Instead of
speaking only about the Scriptures,
the Formula envisions a kind of
multi-level set of authorities : (1)
the "prophetic and apostolic writings of the Old and New Testaments," (2) the " three general
Creeds," (3) the Augsburg Confession as a summary of the "truth of

[God's] Word" which was "brought
to light . .. through the faithful ministry of ... Luther," (4) the Apology,
the Smalcald Articles (and the Treatise), and the two Catechisms of Luther. These documents are then
called "a witness to the truth." Scripture, the creeds, the Augsburg Confession, and then the other confessional writings, all share in authorizing what people need for their
eternal salvation-and that is, as the
Augsburg Confession makes clear,
not a theory about the Bible but the
gospel of Jesus crucified and risen.
Read in its historical context, the
Formula may be seen to be interested in that truth, and not in theories about biblical inerrancy which
were developed in subsequent times.
I

Richard Klann's essay on "Original Sin" (Article I) is an exposition
of the understanding of original sin
in the writings of Luther and of the
Book of Concord generally; only in
the last third of the essay does the
author rehearse the background and
content of Article I of the Formula.
He rightly recognizes that the confessional view does not address the
question of the origin or source of
sin, but rather its effects. The summary is then simple: "No one but
God can rescue fallen man" (p. 121),
and there is no clearer way to accentuate our need for the good news
about Jesus Christ. Still, one must
observe that the essay in no way
takes up any of the distinctively contemporary problems to which the
Formula's teaching on original sin
might conceivably be addressed. As
a result, the doctrine is reduced to
the :..tatus of a museum piece, carefully dusted and lovingly displayed
-but not shown to engage our contemporary situation.
II
Eugene F. Klug surveys Article II
of the Formula on "Free Will, or
25

Human Powers." As in the case of
the preceding essay by Richard
Klann, this essay ranges over materials from Luther and the earlier
confessional writings, then covers
the distinctive contribution of the
Formula- but once more the essay
is a piece of museum theology: clean
and correct, but without demonstrated relevance to, or application
in, the present situation. One looks
in vain for even a hint that the Formula may be helpful in defining what
the Lutheran concern for the gospel
of justification through faith might
contribute to our congregations'
wrestling with "decisions for Christ"
or programs for evangelism-as-salesmanship or sure-fire schemes for
church growth. What good is mere
correctness, if it does not engage the
human situation? What is "contemporary" about this look at the Formula of Concord?
III
In contrast with the preceding
essays, the one by Henry Hamann
on Article III, "The Righteousness
of Faith Before God," brings two
bursts of fresh air. First, he not only
presents the confessional argument
but also shows repeatedly what it is
good for. No mere curator of a dogma-museum, Hamann exposes the
recurring confessional emphasis that
any doctrine worth asserting and
confessing can be shown to magnify
the need for Christ and thereby to
comfort troubled consciences. As
Hamann tells it, confessional theology doesn't just sit there in its utterly
orthodox splendor; it does something, and that something is comfort
for sinners. The second burst of fresh
air that Hamann brings is his readiness to come clean about the limitedness of confessional formulations;
not only does he avoid implying that
the confessional writings are timelessly above history, but he goes so
far as to suggest that this confessional utterance does "not completely"
meet the erring position of the opponent, in this case, Osiander: "the
careful labor of the confessors actually limps far behind the practical
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needs of the believing Christian
heart" (p. 161). Imagine! It is possible to expose the limitations of the
tradition!
IV
David P. Scaer had the assignment of expounding Article IV for
contemporaries: "Good Works:"
One cannot criticize the accuracy of
his presentation. He has caught the
nuances of the controversy, sensed
what was at issue, and presented the
Formula's settlement of this "tempest in a teapot" clearly and accurately. Most refreshingly, he takes issue
with the authors of the Formula.
They had written,
After all, these controvers ies are not , as
some may think , mere misunderstandings
or contentions about words , with one party talking past the other, so that the strife
reflects a mere semantic problem of little
or no consequence. On the contrary. these
controversies deal with weighty and important matters. and they are of such a
nature that the opinions of the erring
party cannot be tolerated in the church of
God , much less be excused and defended
(SD . Introduction, 9).

Yet Scaer can blithely counter,
"Some controversies are more imaginary than real. The controversy
over good works and their necessity
was this kind of controversy" (p .
169). Many will be heartened to discover that it is in fact possible to
criticize the received tradition, so
long as one does so in relatively "insignificant" areas like the role of
good works in relation to justification (which just happens to be the
central issue addressed by the Reformation).
More
substantively,
Scaer gives us a piece of implicit,
but extremely relevant, counsel:
"The controversy among the warring Lutherans might have been
averted if each party had tried to
determine with more care and precision what was really involved in
the other's position" (p. 170). Members of the Missouri Synod will understand the consequences of failure
to take that advice.

pel." Re-enter the bursts of fresh
air. "At the present time," he writes
-never mind for the moment how
the sentence continues; here is a
theologian who knows that there is a
present time! He knows also what
theology is all about: "We see here
how the central Reformation concerns, the merit of Christ and the
comfort of anxious consciences,
again show their influence" (p. 172).
Most encouragingly, Hamann argues that distinguishing law and
gospel does not mean dividing the
biblical statements into two piles
labeled respectively "law" and "gospel." Rather, he asserts, "It is what
is being actually, practically, ex istentially done with them that determines the difference" (p . 182). What
a forward leap that is over the silly
arguing of those who keep wondering whether to put statements such
as "Nimrod was a mighty hunter"
into the law-pile or the gospel-pile!
Even more significantly, Hamann
risks the normally forbidden Sachkritik: in two cases, he observes,
"one may wonder whether the article
on Law and Gospel has found the
best theological statement" (p. 183).
In one of these he says, "in describing a function of the Gospel the
Formula uses terminology usually
reserved for the Law" (p. 185). One
can only rejoice that Hamann, a
New Testament scholar by training,
can risk the charge that a confessional writing has used misleading
and inaccurate language. Hamann's
concern is for essentials: "any confusion of Law and Gospel means a
loss of the Gospel" (p. 186, emphasis his).
Confusion here would easily darken the
merits and benefits of Christ, once more
make the Gospel a teaching of the Law .
and thus rob Christians of the true comfort which they have in the Gospel against
th e terrors of the Law (FC SD V 27 )
(p. 186).

If Hamann is the exemplar, perhaps
Lutheran seminaries should assign
courses in the Confessions to New
Testament scholars.

v

VI

Re-enter Henry Hamann for an
essay on Article V: "Law and Gos-

Eugene Klug argues the case for
"The Third Use of the Law" in ArThe Cresset

Distinguishing law and gospel does not mean dividing the bible into two
piles respectively labeled "law" and gospel." Contemporary Lutherans can
clean up their language by no longer using the label "law" for the Torah.
tide VI. He sees the ar ticle as an
attack on antinomianism of the sort
that taught man's freedom from the
law also in the matter of "godly,
righteous living." According to
Klug, Article VI is fully in accord
not only with Luther but also with
the earlier confessional writings,
most notably articles VI and XX of
the Augsburg Confession. The "contemporary" flavor is given in a section which attacks the views of Elert,
Althaus, and Ebeling as contrary to
that of the Formula.
It seems that nothing in Lutheran
theology generates more heat and
less light than debates about the socalled third use of the law. This is so
(in this reviewer's judgment) because the issue has not yet been clearly stated-not even by the Formula
of Concord. Compromise document
that it is, the Formula holds in tension on the one hand the assertion
that there is no human encounter
with the law of God that does not
accuse and expose sin, and on the
other hand the assertion that there
are no good works which are not in
accord with the Ten Commandments, so that the commandments
give instruction to Christians about
the performance of good works . Both
the Formula and expositor Klug
seem to have missed two crucial
points.
First, the theological label "law"
is unfortunately used to refer not
only to that which demands performance and simultaneously exposes non-performance, but also to
the Torah, the instruction on how
God's people were to live before
him, in which instruction the pious
Israelite could indeed "delight," as
the Psalms repeatedly sing. It would
seem that contemporary Lutherans
could help the Formula toward clarity by cleaning up their terminology
and no longer using the label "law"
for the Torah of the Old Testament
and the paraenesis (i.e., exhortation
to holy living, as in Ephesians 4-6
February, 1980

or Romans 12-15) of the New Testament. For a righteousness of the law
is an attempt to get to God by works;
Torah / paraenesis is the "way" to
live before God as his people. Clarity is not served by using the term
"law" (or the so-called third use of
the law) for the latter.
Secondly, neither Klug nor the
formulators of Article VI seem to
have remembered what was already
clear in the catechisms of Luther,
namely, that the Ten Commandments are fulfilled not by works, but
by faith . It is curious, then, that Klug
should make so much out of the distinction and relation between faith
and works, yet write as if what the
decalog demands is simply mere
performance. Perhaps the work of
Klug's bogey-men (Elert, Althaus,
and Ebeling) has helped to expose
the Formula's inadequacy on this
point. And the fourth article of the
Apology should already have helped
us, as it addressed the question of
how to urge Christians to good
works without losing the promise.
VII
Article VII , "The Holy Supper,"
is expounded by Lowell C. Green,
now on the faculty of Concordia College, River Forest. What is most refreshing about Green's work is its
awareness of the "new knowledge
and corrected information regarding the Lord's Supper in the Confessional Age" which scholars (Green
among them) have brought to light
since the 1950s. Green's work (like
that of Kolb) is distinctive in its
awareness, appreciation, and use of
this wealth of material, some of
which is listed by Green in a special
bibliography at the end of his essay.
Significantly, Green shows that
Article VII mediates, not between
Gnesio-Lutherans and Philippists,
but between the sacramentology of
Luther and that of Melanchthon.
Contrary to the traditional view,

Green holds that Melanchthon was
not guilty of a "Crypto-Calvinist"
view of the sacrament. In an intriguing table (p. 211) Green sketches
the respective positions of Luther
and Melanchthon, along with the
compromises of the Formula. And
he wryly observes that Melanchthon's view has subsequently been
thought to be Luther's, and Luther's
has in fact been forgotten by many
theologians and teachers.
There follows a straightforward
exposition of the crucial elements of
the Formula's sacramental theology,
focused in the three characteristic
affirmations of Lutherans: (1) the
sacramental union, i.e., that Christ's
body and blood are really present
together with the blessed bread and
wine; (2) the manducatio ora/is, or
oral eating, i.e., that communicants
receive Christ's body and blood by
their eating and drinking of the
blessed bread and cup; and (3) the
manducatio indignorum, or eating
by the unworthy, i.e., that also unbelieving, unworthy communican ts
receive Christ's body and blood,
albeit to their judgment. On that
basis Green ventures some contemporary liturgical criticism, opposing
in particular the idea of a "fourfold
action" in the eucharistic liturgy.
Against the idea of an offering of
the elements and a eucharistic prayer, he observes, "The offering and
the eucharistic prayer turn acts of
God into human actions; this is a
confounding of Law and Gospel"
(p. 224). Further, he argues that to
refer to the consecrated elements as
"bread" and "wine" reflects an indifference to the sacramental union
of bread with body, wine with blood.
Green's criticisms are sometimes
voiced also by other American Lutherans unhappy with certain features of liturgical renewal in our
day. But the criticisms are really unfounded; the Formula does not hesitate to break both of those rules in
sections 79-87 of Article VII. And
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the Apology clearly states about the
sacrament, "There is also a sacrifice,
since one action can have several
purposes" (Ap XXIV, 74).

have been left unplanted. Perhaps
the ferment in contemporary christology will give some Lutheran theologians occasion to plant them so
that we may see how they grow.

VIII
IX
Bjarne W. Teigen, President
Emeritus of Bethany College, Mankato, Minnesota, writes the exposition of Article VIII, "The Person of
Christ." His work is a competent,
straightforward, and reasonably
useful tour through the Formula's
christology, regularly showing its
connections with the preceding article on the Lord's Supper. Though
there is some tendency to read later
dogmatic terms back into the Formula, this does not skew the presentation or render it historically inaccurate. To Teigen 's credit, he stresses also that a proper christology is
no mere museum piece but is necessary for the sake of our salvation.
What this reviewer misses, however,
is a sensitivity to the tension running
through the christology of the Formula and of Luther before it. While
the traditional two-natures christology which wc..s developed in the
early Church is affirmed and sometimes simply assumed as a matterof-course, there are seeds in Luther'~.
theology (and some of these are
quoted by the formulators of Article
VIII) of another christology, one
which so unites God and man in
Christ that "apart from this man
there is no God." Quoting from
Luther's Great Confession, the Formula continues:
if you can say. " H ere is God ." then you
must also say, "Christ the man is present,
too ," and if you could show me one place
where God is and not the man , then the
person is already divided and I could at
once say truthfully , " H ere is God who is
not man and has never become man." But
No , comno God like that for me! .
rade . wherever you put God dow n for me ,
you must also put the ~umanity down for
me (sec . 82-84 ).

Once one realizes that Luther is
speaking of "God" and not just of
"deity" or "god-ness," one sees that
Lutheran christology has within it
the seeds of a development beyond
the definitions of the fourth and
fifth centuries. Sadly, these seeds
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C. George Fry contributes an essay on "Christ's Descent into Hell,"
as touched on in Article IX. Fry's
essay is distinguished by the lack of
even a single footnote, by its evident
failure to have taken any of the primary sources into account, and by
its failure to have reckoned with a
1974 dissertation on the subject (referred to by Robert Kolb in note
52). As a result Fry can offer only a
misleading rehash of outdated and
just plain erroneous judgments
about the situation addressed by
Article IX. To compound the problem, he refers repeatedly to "the
Lutherans" as being in "agreement"
on this or that facet of the understanding of Christ's descensus, yet
not once does he suggest who those
"Lutherans" were, and not once does
he cite any of their writings. He asserts that sixteenth-century Lutherans held views which were in fact
developed only in the seventeenth
century under the pressure of polemical necessity. He completely
misrepresents Luther's descensustheology. He gives no evidence of
any real understanding of the controversy in Hamburg involving John
Aepinus. And his summary of the
Formula's teaching on the descensus is a marvel of invention.
To straighten out this mixture of
confusion and error, it must be observed that Luther nowhere taught
the triumphal descensus of the Baroque dogmaticians, but instead
taught a view of the descensus fully
in accord with his theology of the
cross: Christ is Lord over death and
hell because he has undergone their
torments. And Luther explicitly
denies that the descensus was a real
movement from one place to another: "if you want to speak exactly,
he never went there; he remained
on the cross, in the grave, or in heaven" (WA XXXVI, 161). Further,
Luther taught that the descensus

was Christ's experience of death in
body and soul, thus a descensus "to
the dead," to the "grave of the soul":
"in body and in soul he is placed
beyond the limits of this life, and the
soul goes to its place as if to its grave"
(WA XXX/1, 517). Luther approved
the traditional images of the harrowing of hell, not because they portray what actually happened, but
because they offer comfort to sinners: Christ went all the way to the
grave and the place of the dead, so
that when we must go that way we
shall not experience any ordeal or
visit any place that is not under
Christ's Lordship.
Most of what Fry asserts as the
Lutheran "consensus" about the descensus was developed in the polemical situation of the seventeenth
century and has little to do with
Luther, or the Formula of Concord,
or any sixteenth-century Lutheran's
published views-except, in some
ways, the views of Melanchthon. It
is surely ironic that some LC-MS
theologians have argued for an understanding (and a corresponding
translation) of the descensus article
which developed long after Luther's
death, and that they have so argued
as if thereby to be preserving a genuinely Lutheran view. What they
have defended is a mixture of the
medieval view (against which Luther
reacted) and that of Melanchthon;
in the process, the view Luther actually held has been condemned as
"Reformed" and "un-Lutheran."
X

Kurt Marquart expounds Article
X, under the title "Confession and
Ceremonies." With characteristic
bite, Marquart sets the issue clearly
and observes accurately that this
article has implications not only for
church customs and ceremonies but
also for ecclesiology itself. Marquart sees FC X as a commentary on
AC VII in two crucial points: (1)
unity in the church is not a two-stage
affair according to which there is
first a kind of invisible unity of faith
and then secondly a visible and outward or organizational harmony or
agreement, and (2) such unity exists
The Cresset

Luther so united God and man in Christ that "apart from this man there is no
God." Lutheran christology could well be developed beyond the definitions of
the fourth and fifth centuries. Doctrine does not fall full-blown from heaven.
when there is agreement "in the doctrine and all its articles," in the
entire "God-given Gospel-doctrine"
in all its "full-orbed splendor and
integrity" (p. 269).
One must be cheered that a Missouri Synod theologian can publicly
criticize a piece of the tradition, in
this case the distinction between the
visible and the invisible church.
And in the wake of the recent "Formula for Concord" essays and meetings throughout the synod, it is refreshing to see a Missourian in good
standing with the present regime
call into question that regime's oftused distinction between "unity"
and "concord." It is especially helpful to see that done so evidently on
the basis of the gospel. But it is all
the more distressing, then, to see
Marquart push the "truth of the gospel" in the direction of a quantified
(and maximum) idea of "the doctrine and all its articles." His argument, briefly, is this: proper church
unity, including agreement in such
externals as organization and ceremony, is possible only when there is
"prior agreement in doctrine" (the
appeal is to SD X 16), and such agreement in doctrine must be thorough,
including every "larger or smaller
area or aspect of the one Christian
truth" (p. 269). In support of this
view, Marquart surveys the use of
the word "article" in the earlier confessional writings, in particular the
preface to the Augsburg Confession
and the section on the Creed in the
Large Catechism. If he is right, then
Missouri's insistence upon full, or at
least very substantial, doctrinal
agreement as a precondition for
church fellowship would be shown
to have the support of the Book of
Concord.
But is that in fact the case? Does
FC X require such a conclusion? I
think not, though the grounds are
rather a little complex. Consider
the following:
(1) In AC VII, the ground for
February, 1980

unity is "that the Gospel be preached eintraechtiglich," i.e., harmoniously, agreeably, with unanimity; the Latin reads, "to consent concerning the doctrine of
the Gospel." Here, "de doctrina
evangelii" means the activity of
teaching or preaching the Gospel,
since it is paired with de administratione sacramentorum (concerning the administering of the sacraments), and since it is parallel
to the German gepredigt (preached).
Thus the primary referent for
doctrina is the actually preached
gospel, not theoretical formulations of "doctrine(s)."
(2) The equation of "doctrine"
and "gospel" is common in FC X,
being found in sections 2, 5, 10, 14.
The natural reading of "doctrine"
in section 31 would be the same,
i.e., the preached gospel.
(3) That the primary and natural
meaning of "doctrine" is the
preached gospel is supported also
by the usage of the term in Andreae's Six Sermons, a preliminary stage in the development of
the Formula, and in Melanchthon's Loci Communes, a theological textbook in which almost all
the reformation preachers and
theologians had been trained.
(4) Marquart's appeal to SD V 1,
23, 24 as support for his view of
the meaning of "article" is in fact
an appeal to the Latin translation;
the German original speaks of
"zwo Lehren," "zwo PrPd~gten,"
"beide Lehr" (two teachings, two
sermons, both doctrines).
(5) When the Augsburg Confession speaks of "articles" it is not,
as Professor Marquart suggests,
speaking of doctrinal formulations, but of the parts of the confession. The Preface concludes,
"This is our confession and that
of our associates, and it is specifically stated, article by article, in
what follows." The confessors can
hardly have meant to confess

every "larger or smaller area or
aspect of the one Christian truth,"
since there is nothing in the Augsburg Confession on the papacy,
on indulgences, on transubstantiation, or on purgatory-in spite
of the importance of those topics
at the time! Nor does the Formula of Concord address these
topics (with the exception of transubstantiation) in any substantial
way. It seems unfair, then, to
suppose that FC SD X, 31 suddenly establishes as a criterion for
church unity prior and total agreement on all points or parts of
Christian doctrine, especially on
parts which came to be controverted only in subsequent centuries-such as the ordination of
women, or the use of historicalcritical methods of biblical study
(to cite but two areas presently
hotly contested among Lutherans).
The point of the confessional
writings, also in the case of AC VII
and FC S, is not to establish a list
of articles (such as those in AC
I-XXI) on which agreement is to
be required, but to call for a stance,
a determination that whatever
matters be touched on, they be
touched on in a way that keeps
clear the gospel about forgiveness
"by grace, for Christ's sake, through
faith" (AC IV). Our confession
must be evangelical-whatever
points it comes to address. The
gospel is the only substantive criterion, after all! Marquart comes
close to that when he speaks of the
"whole organism of Christian doctrine," but he persists in nuancing
that notion in a quantified way
when he calls for understanding
"Gospel-doctrine as consisting of
individual 'articles' "(p. 269).
(6) SD X 31 is made to stand on its
head when it is used to state maximalist conditions for church
unity; the argument actually
moves in such a way as to assume
evangelical agreement. Churches
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will not condemn each other because of a difference in ceremonies, "so long as they are one with
each other in the doctrine and all
its articles (i.e., the preached gospel) as well as in the right use of
the holy sacraments" (my translation). The article addresses
churches which are "one with
each other" in their preaching of
the gospel and use of the sacraments; such churches will not condemn one another over externals
like ceremonies, institutional
forms, or theological formulations. Like the Augsburg Confession, the Formula operates with a
gospel-and-sacraments-in-action
criterion, not a more-or-fewerdoctrines criterion for church
unity.
(7) Who are the "churches" meant
in SD X 31? If they are the various territorial churches in the
Lutheran camp, then this statement assumes their full fellowship-whether Gnesio-Lutheran,
Phillippist, or Swabian. If they are
the Lutherans on the one hand
and the Romans on the other hand
(as is clearly the case in AC VII),
then this statement would, along
with AC VII, assume the unity of
Lutheran and Roman communions and would enjoin them torefrain from mutual condemnation.
In either case, commonly preached
gospel-and-sacraments constitutes a prima facie case for the
unity of the church. The Lutherans were ready, after all, to submit
to the Roman bishops if only they
would tolerate the Lutheran
preaching of the Gospel; thus the
Lutherans were clearly ready to
tolerate the Roman preaching of
the Gospel! Woe, then, to those
who refuse to recognize unity because of the presence or absence
of ceremonies and theological
formulations.
(8) If modern Missourians nevertheless insist on prior and complete theological agreement, they
put themselves into a genuine
bind. If there must be agreement
in all the larger and smaller areas
or aspects of doctrine, then there
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can be agreement in none. Suppose that X andY share a common
theology of justification, but differ
on the descensus; then X and Y
would not, according to current
LC-MS logic, be in fellowship.
They would not have a consensus
about doctrine "and all its articles."
And they would have to dispute
each other's claim to be the church
at all. No, preached gospel and
done sacraments constitute a
prima facie case for church unity,
a unity which may not be broken
or denied by divergences in matters external.
Marquart's plea for the "organic,
holistic understanding of Gospeldoctrine" (p. 269) is well-taken; it is
unfortunate that what he gives with
the one hand he takes away with the
other by lapsing into a quantified
understanding of the ground for
unity.
XI
Editor Robert Preus, President
of the Fort Wayne seminary, writes
on Article XI, "Predestination and
Election." Preus presents the evangelical teaching on this topic with
clarity and directness, reflecting in
the process his own broad acquaintance with the Baroque theologians,
as well as his readiness to criticize
them when polemical concerns
forced them into awkward or less
than adequate formulations (see
note 4, p. 313). One would only
hope that the essay had gone beyond mere exposition and had mined
the resources of this article of the
Formula for the contemporary life
of the church.
XII
C. George Fry returns as the author of "Other Factions and Sects,"
discussing Article XII. Fry sketches
briefly some facets of the "radical
Reformation" and then summarizes the Formula's various condemnations . Those condemnations are,
for the most part, gratuitous; they
were included to show that the authors of the Formula "have no part
or share in their [the "sectar-

ians"] errors" (SD XII, 8). Fry asserts that these condemnations are
significant in that they anticipate
"the struggles to be fought against
modern rationalism and neopaganism in the subsequent centuries"
(p. 290). But he does not succeed in
showing what that significance is or
how the Formula can be a resource
in dealing with whatever modern
movements he refers to under the
labels "rationalism" and "neopaganism."
A bibliography is appended,
which includes many kinds of works,
some of which are only tangentially
related to the Formula of Concord.
Strangely absent are some important
items, such as Gritsch and Jenson's
Lutheranism and the special number of the Sixteenth Century Journal which includes the essays from a
1977 conference of LCUSA theologians on the Formula of Concord.
Readers interested in additional
resources should consult the bibliography prepared by Robert Kolb
which appears in Confession and
Congregation, the volume of essays
from a conference for parish leaders
on the Formula of Concord held at
Valparaiso University, 19-22 October 1977, published as Occasional
Paper III of The Cresset.
There is little to praise in this
volume. Apart from the essays by
Kolb and Hamann there is little that
is original or fresh, and what is not
is often misleading. Since the book
sells for only $9.95, while most books
of comparable size are in the $15.00
price range, one can only assume
that the publication of this volume
has been subsidized to some degree.
'Tis a pity that those funds could not
have been used to support scholarship that was in fact "contemporary"
and which would better show the
evangelical resources provided by
the Formula for the life and work of
the church in our time and place.
But then, if this is after all a book for
the having and not for the reading,
most of this review essay has been
exercise in futility, proceeding as it
has to treat the volume as a serious
piece of theological writing for the
contemporary church.
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------------------On Turning Sixty

John Strietelmeier

Lent, 1934. The boy sits with his
family in the pew where his grandparents sat when St. Peter's Church
was new. Through the barely open
windows the first breezes of a southern Indiana Spring distract the boy's
attention from the liturgy of the
midweek evening service. Inside the
half-dark church, the penitential
words and music of " 0 Lamb of God
Most Holy." Outside, but carried on
the breeze into the church, another
world, the world of which the boy
has been reading in National Geographic Magazine. The boy is caught
in a tug-of-war between love for this
world which, for all its probable
wickedness, is too lovely not to be
loved, and a faith which tells him
that he must not love the world or
the things of the world.
The boy's world is a secure world.
He is related to at least half of the
members of this large congregation.
His parochial school teacher taught
his father. He has never known any
other pastor than Pastor Brauer,
now in the fullest vigor of a long
ministry at St. Peter's. The mayor of
the town is an old friend of the family. The county sheriff is one of the
boy's innumerable second cousins.
Two of the four elders who sit in the
front pew for the ostensible purpose
of keeping the sovereign congrega32

tion's collective eye on the pastor's
orthodoxy bear the boy's surname;
another is his maternal grandmother's cousin. One knows one's
slot in such a setting. Another tugof-war between a need to be deeply
rooted and the call which it is death
to refuse: "Come, follow Me."
The boy's futu re seems secure and
predictable. In a few weeks, that day
of wrath, the dreadful day, Examination Sunday, yielding its peaceful
reward the following Sunday in confirmation and an oxford-grey suit
with long pants. Then high school.
Then college. Then law school.
Then (thirty years down the line)
the judgeship of the Ninth Judicial
Circuit of Indiana and a brick colonial house on North Washington
Street. Perhaps even an eldership in
the congregation. Somewhere along
the line marriage, if a candidate can
be found in the congregation who is
not within the prohibited degrees
of consanguinity. Mother has al ready compiled a short list of possible candidates. The frontrunner
in the boy's book is not on Mother's
list-and not, it would appear, in
church tonight. (Teacher Koch is
aware of the special relationship between the boy and the girl to whom
he has never worked up the courage
to speak. He arranges for them to
get each other's papers to grade.)
Those are lovely homes up on Washington Street. Still another tug-ofwar between the need to succeed and
the stern command: "Deny yourself."
Lent, 1980. The sixty-year-old
man sits with his grandson in the
handsome new Immanuel Church.
Spring conies late to northern Indiana. The warmth of the church after
the chill outside makes the man
drowsy.
The tug-of-war n€ver ends. There
is much to be said for being fully
and merely human. Then one could
at least accept the defeat that awaits
all things human with dignity and
with grace. In fact, his own mortality
might well be the least of his con-

cerns. For one does not live six decades without coming to suspect that
he may not, after all, be the center of
the universe. There are people and
things whose survival is much more
important than the survival of one's
life-worn self.
Susan Ertz once observed that
"millions long for immortality who
do not know what to do with themselves on a rainy Sunday afternoon."
Here in this church, the man would
be most content to say, "Thank you,
Sir, but don't put Yourself out any
more for me"-and be on his way.
Dylan Thomas was very young when
he advised us all not to go gentle
into that good night. A sixty-yearold pagan might be more inclined to
accept Swinburne's counsel to "thank
with brief thanksgiving I Whatever
gods may be I That no life lives forever; I That dead men rise up never;
I That even the weariest river I
Winds somewhere safe to sea."
Alas, the man is not a pagan. The
very mention of the word "river"
arouses memories of hearing about
"a pure river of the water of life,
clear as crystal , proceeding out of
the throne of God and of the Lamb."
All of the experiences of his life have
conspired to teach him that security
is an illusion, that life is unpredictable and undirectable. But beyond
experience and often contradicting
experience is the Word. No one of
the dreams of his boyhood worked
out quite as he had expected; most
did not work out at all. But only because a boy's eye can not see, nor his
ear hear the things that God has prepared for those who love him.
What does it all add up to? Hard
to say. Anyway, young Andy wants
to sing. Come on, boy, I'll teach you
some good words:
Thou on my head in early youth
did smile,
And though rebellious and
perverse meanwhile,
Thou has not left me, oft as I
left Thee.
On to the close, 0 Lord , abide
with me.
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